POLICING NEO-LIBERAL REFORMS: THE RULE OF LAW AS
AN ENABLING AND RESTRICTIVE DISCOURSE
JOEL M. NGUGI*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.

IN TRODUCTION ............................................................................

2.
3.

THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND FREEDOM ....................
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT

4.

AND MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS ...........................................
THE RULE OF LAW DEFINED .......................................................

4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
5.

The Proceduralor Formal Conception
of the Rule of Law ......................................
The Substantive Conception
of the R ule of Law ...........................................................
The Functional Conception
of the R ule of Law ...........................................................

514
519
523
533
.535
537
539

THE RULE OF LAW IN "RULE OF LAW PROJECTS"
BY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES:

6.

540
A FOURTH MEANING ..................................................................
THE RULE OF LAW AS A "THICK CONCEPT". ............................ 554

7.

THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND

PARTICIPATORY POLITICS ...........................................................

8.

560

THE RULE OF LAW AS A TOOL TO POLICE PROGRAMMATIC

566
of
Participation
Nature
Politics
and
The
in StructuralAdjustment Programs.............................. 567
The Regulation of Bank Interest Rates
572
in K enya ..........................................................................
Privatizationin Poland.................................................. 578

PROPOSALS: THREE ILLUSTRATIONS .........................................

8.1.
8.2.
8.3.
9.

THE LINK BETWEEN THE "THICK CONCEPTION"
OF RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
"W ASHINGTON CONSENSUS". ...................................................

582

10.

CON CLUSIO N ...............................................................................

597

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
1.

[Vol. 26:3

INTRODUCTION

In recent years we have experienced the second wave of the
Law and Development movement.' Just as the first one, the second
wave is characterized by attempts to reform the laws of developing
countries. 2 The argument is that particular legal institutions are
necessary for economic growth.3 The task of various International
Development Agencies ("IDAs")4 is to determine first which legal
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law; L.L.B,
University of Nairobi, Kenya; S.J.D., L.L.M, Harvard Law School. I would like to
thank my research assistant, Marie V. Ericson, and my administrative assistant,
Cathy Owens, for their diligent and valuable help with this article.
1 See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Building Strong and Independent Judiciaries Through
the New Law and Development: Behind The Paradox Of Consensus Programs and
Perpetually DisappointingResults, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 385-88 (2002) (reviewing both
the first [or "old Law and Development"] and second [or "new Law and
Development"] waves of "Law and Development" and explaining why they
failed to achieve their stated objectives). Some commentators have pointed out
that there were earlier waves of Law and Development. Such a list would include
the efforts to export the French civil code to the rest of Europe, the attempts to
export the same code to parts of Africa and Asia during the colonial period, and
the exportation of American law and legal values to Asia after the Second World
War and so forth. See, e.g., John Reitz, Export of the Rule of Law, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 429, 446 (2003) (commenting generally on issues surrounding the
exportation of the rule of law, particularly to countries emerging from state
socialism and Communist Party-dominated democracy in the 1990s). However,
the term "Law and Development" was first applied to the efforts to modernize
newly independent states in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. These efforts were
centered around efforts to export American-style law and legal institutions to
these states on the theory that such laws and legal institutions were central to
economic development. These efforts floundered in the 1970s, hastened to their
death, in part, by vociferous critics from within the institutions applying the
theory. However, the fall of communism and the rise of market models in the
1980s and 1990s led to a re-awakening of the Law and Development movement.
This article discusses the treatment of the rule of law in this second wave of Law
and Development.
2 I use "developing countries" in the same sense International Development
Agencies use the term, i.e. in terms of low and middle income levels per capita.
According to the World Bank, a country with a Gross National Income ("GNI")
per capita of $735 or less in 2002 would be classified as low-income. A country
with a GNI per capita of between $736 and $9,075 in 2002, would be considered
middle-income. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2004: MAKING
SERVICES WORK FOR POOR PEOPLE viii (2004) (defining income classifications).
3 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1996: FROM PLAN To
MARKET 86 (1996) [hereinafter, WORLD BANK, FROM PLAN To MARKET] (arguing

that good laws and effective enforcement are critical to the economic growth of
institutions).
4 By "International Development Agencies" ("IDAs"), I am referring to
development agencies that sponsor various law reform projects in developing and
transitional economies. These include some of the public international financial
institutions ("IFIs") such as the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World
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institutions spur economic growth and then to sponsor efforts to
5
install such institutions through various legal reform projects.
These reform projects are often justified as, and incorporated into
the general rubric of, "Rule of Law projects." 6 However, the rule of
law is a contested concept. 7 So what rule of law conception do the
IDAs apply in the Rule of Law projects that they sponsor? What
informs their choice of conception of the rule of law?
In this article, I explore the way IDAs, in general, have
deployed the twin concepts of "rule of law" and "democracy." The
general argument is that the rule of law discourse by these
agencies uses the concept of the rule of law to generate a language
of open-ended and participatory politics while simultaneously
foreclosing the possibility of multiple and competitive politics.
The rule of law discourse justifies Rule of Law projects in
developing countries in terms of the rule of law being a neutral
device or mechanism that guarantees formal integrity of the
process of politics, governance, and economic development. This
process is subsequently filled with local politics and conditions in a
competitive process. 8 Under this conception, rule of law has no
Bank Group, and various regional development banks. As I use it, IDAs also
include various national agencies tasked with the responsibility of promoting
economic development abroad. These national agencies join IFIs in both funding
development projects and law reform activities in developing countries.
Examples of such national agencies include the United States Agency for
International Development ("USAID"); the Swedish International Development
Agency ("SIDA"); the Canadian International Development Agency ("CIDA");
and United Kingdom's Department for International Development ("DFID").
5 World Bank, FROM PLAN TO MARKET, supra note 3, at 86. The World Bank
refers to the legal institutions necessary to spur economic growth as "good laws."
The categorization of some laws as "good" recurs throughout this article.
6 I have capitalized Rule of Law when I am speaking of the various projects
which IDAs fund and promote with the aim of promoting the establishment and
observance of rule of law in developing countries. I have not capitalized rule of
law when speaking of the rule of law itself as an institution or concept or the
discourse that emerges from the interactions of the IDAs' experts, consultants,
development scholars, and lawyers involved in these projects.
7 Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781, 791
(1989).
8 This is driven by the idea that the state is a "civil association" as opposed to
an "enterprise association." This civil association view of the state denies any
substantive economic function for the state and views the role of the state as
merely to provide the institutional framework in which economic actors make
their decisions. In this conception, legal institutions are pragmatic, neutral
devices that the economic actors use to exchange freely in the generalized,
impersonal marketplace. On the other hand, the enterprise association view of
the state concedes the necessity, or at least the inevitability, of the state playing a
substantive role in the economic functioning of the society. For example, this
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substantive morality that it seeks to impose on a given polity-but
only ensures the integrity of the formal procedures that allow
individual actors to shape their own decisions in the marketplace. 9
However, it turns out that the rule of law discourse is
operationalized in such a way that it forecloses political debate
rather than expanding the possibilities of multiple and competitive
politics, even though it expresses its objectives in this open-ended
vocabulary.' 0
This article argues that, while utilizing the open-ended
language of the rule of law, the prevailing rule of law discourse by
IDAs sells and entrenches particular policies and political projects
that are dissolved into the idea of rule of law. I use the term "thick
concept" to indicate how the prevailing rule of law discourse
conflates procedural, substantive, descriptive, and prescriptive
aspects of the rule of law to imbue it with particular political
choices.11 A "thick concept" as I use it, means a concept that, by
being both descriptive and evaluative, hopes to create the
conditions for action and to urge the action at the same time. The
result is that the Rule of Law projects predetermine politics. The
rule of law, as instituted by these Rule of Law projects, serves the
purpose of insulating a particular vision of moral foundation or
philosophy of the good of the society from the reach of political
debate, consensus, or revision by the participants in a given polity.
The effect has been that the rule of law becomes the underlying
discourse that facilitates and justifies the shift of power and
discretion within the government to technocrats who are less
responsive to popular demands and politics. Thus, the Rule of
Law projects serve the purpose of prescribing the philosophy of
the good of the society by technocratic means. This is because
these projects succeed in insulating some fundamental political
decisions from debate or revision.
This is contrary to the
articulated objectives of the political reforms that typically
accompany these Rule of Law projects, that of democratizing
view would consider the use of laws to achieve substantive purposes such as
social welfare. See, e.g., DEEPAK LAL, THE POVERTY OF 'DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS'
160 (2000).
9 See infra Sections 4 and 5.
10 See infra Sections 6 and 7.
11 As I explain in Section 6 infra, I have borrowed "thick concept" from
philosophy to denote the property of a concept to host a union of factual and
evaluative content simultaneously. See infra notes 159-164 and accompanying
text.
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political and economic decisionmaking in developing countries. In
short, the rule of law as instituted by these projects constricts the
emancipatory potential of democracy.
The specific objective of this article is two-fold. First, this
article contests the orthodox view that the rule of law in the
neoliberal formulation is an institutional mechanism through
which government cedes its economic role to the market
participants. 12 Rather, I demonstrate that this version of the rule of
law becomes a totalitarian imposition of a structure that ensures
participation in an already decided politic.' 3 Second, I aim to
demonstrate how the institution of rule of law in the neoliberal
conception subverts democracy by cushioning some fundamental
political questions from political debate.' 4 Rather than becoming a
tool for ensuring accountability and political participation, the rule
of law becomes a mechanism for legitimating the introduction and
12 As James Thuo Gathii notes, the "good governance" discourse which
undergirds the Rule of Law projects is based on "the promise and hope that
markets under the good governance regime are an antidote to the restrictions of
state involvement in the economy that characterized modernizing
nationalism...." James Thou Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on
Africa's Economic and Political Predicaments: Continuitiesand Discontinuities in Legal
Outcomes Between Markets and States, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971, 972 (2000) [hereinafter
Gathii, Retelling Good Governance].
13 Amrohini Sahay, Transforming Race Matters: Towards a Critique-al Cultural
Studies, CULTURAL LOGIC, Spring 1998, available at http://eserver.org/clogic/12/sahay.html. On the concept of decided politics as a form of coercion and
domination, since it involves the totalitarian imposition of the will of those
wielding the program of action, see generally DICK HOWARD, THE POLITICS OF
CRITIQUE (1988).
14 Prof. Roberto Unger's definition of neoliberalism is useful:

[Nleoliberalism is the program committed to orthodox macroeconomic
stabilization, especially through fiscal balance, achieved more by
containment of public spending than by increases in the tax take; to
liberalization in the form of increasing integration into the world trading
system and its established rules; to privatization, understood both more
narrowly as the withdrawal of government from production and more
generally as the adoption of standard Western private law; and to the
deployment of compensatory social policies ("social-safety nets")
designed to counteract the unequalizing effects of other planks in the
orthodox platform.
ROBERTO UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE 53 (Verso
1998). In developing countries, efforts to install a neo-liberal state include
privatization of state enterprises, deregulation of private economic activity,
liberalization of trade, and cut back of state spendin coupled with legal reforms
aimed at instituting a free market economy. Typically, these legal reforms are
enacted under the banner of Rule of Law projects and include reforms of anticorruption, judicial administration, and commercial laws.
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continuation of a set of economic reform policies enacted "by
surprise and independently of public opinion and of representative
organizations and institutions." 15
The suggestion is that, while there might be something to be
said about the recent gains in curtailing state power by civil society
in developing countries, we need to be careful about exaggerating
the virtues of the recent reforms and of the civil society itself.
Traditional tools for emancipation, even those as hallowed as rule
of law and democracy, may well be used to serve the exact
opposite purposes, such as ridding the political and economic
development of developing countries of all democratic content.
All this while civil society and intellectuals from the Third World
16
cheer energetically.
In sections 2 and 3 of this article, I build the context in which
the rule of law is offered in development programs as both a
development goal and a means to achieve development. In
sections 4 and 5, I explore the ways IDAs define the rule of law and
look at the various criticisms to these definitions. In section 6, I
introduce the idea of "thick concept" to describe the way IDAs
deploy the institution of the rule of law. In section 7, I briefly
explore the relationship of rule of law, democracy, and
participatory politics in the context of market-oriented reforms.
The aim here is to show how a thick conception of the rule of law
gives way to a procedural conception of democracy, further
insulating fundamental political decisions from revision by
democratic majorities. In this way, the rule of law acts as an
effective tool for policing neoliberal reforms. Once the reforms are
justified by the thick conception of the rule of law, the procedural
conception of democracy keeps .the reforms safe from revision or
subversion even by a democratic majority. In section 8, I use three
examples to show this policing in action:
(1) in the way
privatization was popularized and carried out in Poland; (2) in the
politics of regulation of bank interest rates in Kenya; and (3) in the
15 ADAM

PRZEWORSKI,

DEMOCRACY

AND

THE

MARKET:

POLITICAL

AND

183 (1991).
16 In contrast to the term "developing countries," which I use in this article in
the same sense in which IDAs use it, I use the term "Third World" here as an
analytical category. See Balakrishnan Raiagopal, Locating the Third World in
Cultural Geography,, THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1 (1998-99) (discussing the differing
uses of Third World as a category). As an analytical concept, Third World
deemphasizes the importance of geography, political ideology, and historical
origins. Instead, it emphasizes both the power contest between holders and actors
and its articulation in international relations.
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA
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politics and nature of participation in structural adjustment
programs generally. In section 9, I provide a link between the thick
conceptions of the rule of law, democracy, and the Washington
Consensus, before concluding in section 10.
2.

THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND FREEDOM

I begin this substantive section with two quotations that are
relevant to the discussion of the relationship between the rule of
law and democracy in the midst of the market-oriented legal
reforms of the 1990s in developing countries. 17 The first is by Dean
Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School, written in 1909. Dean
Pound, establishing what would become a watershed point in the
history of American contract law and American legal realism
generally, wrote:
[Liet us compare the equally positive statement of a
sociologist: "much of the discussion about 'equal rights' is
utterly hollow. All the ado made over the system of
To everyone
contract is surcharged with fallacy."
acquainted at first hand with actual industrial conditions
the latter statement goes without saying. Why then do
courts persist in the fallacy? Why do so many of them force
upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the face
of practical conditions of inequality? Why do we find a
great and learned court in 1908 taking the long step into the
past of dealing with the relation between employer and
employee in railway transportation, as if the parties were
individuals -as if they were farmers haggling over the sale
of a horse? 18
Dean Pound supplies the answer to his own rhetorical query:
the "juristic fallacy" is caused by an individualistic conception of
17 Market-oriented legal reforms are the reforms typically required by the
neoliberal model to usher in economic development. See supra note 14. These
reforms are often described as Rule of Law projects even though they often
encompass much more than subjects traditionally known as rule of law.
18 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract,18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909) (internal citations
omitted). Morton Horwitz argues that Roscoe Pound precociously anticipated the
legal realist revolution that mounted an internal critique of the 19th century
Classical Legal Thought formalist doctrines of contract. MORTON HORWITz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 34 (1992).
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justice, "which exaggerates the importance of property and of
contract, exaggerates private right at the expense of public right,
and is hostile to legislation, taking a minimum of law-making to be
the ideal." 19
The second quotation is by David Apter. Written in 1987, well
into the era that witnessed the third wave of the democracy
movement and the rule of law revival in international relations,
Apter mourned the death of genuine democracy in the hands of
the market-friendly democracy. 20 He stated, "[d]evelopmental
rationality - far from legitimizing democracy - presides over the
into
the
bureaucratization
and
latter's
conversion
21
instrumentalization of social life."
In the first quotation, Roscoe Pound complains about the idea
that abstract notions, such as equality before the law, render
22
substantively fair or rational distributive outcomes in the society.
This is because, often, such notions operate amidst a context of
disproportionate inequalities of power and wealth. 23 Hence,
justifying procedural legitimacy on abstract notions like equality
and freedom of contract is only pretext for justifying the extant
distribution of access to political power, wealth, and influence. 24 In
order to redress this situation, Roscoe Pound identified mechanical
jurisprudence as the main culprit in the jurisprudential
formulation that justified the operation of the taxonomic categories
marshaled under prior precedents. 25 His solution was to propose
the social "double agenda of sociological jurisprudence and
19 Roscoe Pound, supra note 18, at 457.
20

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE:

DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE

TWENTIETH CENTURY 3 (1996). Huntington refers to the widespread international
push toward democracy beginning with the late 1970s to the present as the third
wave of democratization. According to Huntington, the other waves occurred
between 1828 and 1926 and between 1943 and 1962, each followed by reversals.
He identifies the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian governments
unable to cope with military defeat and economic failure, and the push to
promote human rights and democracy by external actors such as nongovernmental organizations and the European Community as some of the most
important factors enabling this third wave.
21 DAVID APTER, RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT:

MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY

AND POST-MODERN POLITICS 9 (1987).
22 See also Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 603 (1943) (discussing the societal effects, and resulting power struggle, of
people bargaining for the goods necessary to satisfy their everyday needs).
23

Id.

24 BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE
25

Pound, supra note 18, at 462-3.
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socialist doctrines." 26 In anticipating the realist revolution in
American academia, Pound suggested that a particular set of antiformalist insights associated with sociological jurisprudence could
be used to rein the extreme "formal individualism" that had led to
mechanical jurisprudence. 27 However, note that he associated this
"formal individualism" with ideas that exaggerate the meaning of
28
property and freedom of contract.
In the second quotation, David Apter complains that the nature
of democracy instituted by market oriented reform is not one
characteristic of peoples' genuine participation, as the concept of
demos should reflect.29 Rather, it implies the meeting of certain
structural correlations that can be indexed and checked out as
satisfying the democratic criterion. 30 Like Roscoe Pound in an
earlier era, Apter complains about the operationalization of
democracy as an abstract notion - one that merely stamps approval
on an already decided politics-but without real punch to make
31
effective and meaningful changes to the status quo.
Roscoe Pound identified what caused the particular operation
of the abstract notion of freedom of contract to unsatisfactorily
achieve the very opposite of the contract concept in industrial
relations: the operation of the taxonomies of formal
solution was therefore the enabling of the
individualism. 32 His 33
"antiformalist social."
On the other hand, in this article, I
undertake to find a parallel investigation to what causes the
impoverishment of genuine participation and decisionmaking
26 Amr Shalakany, The Analytics Of The Social In Private Law Theory: A
Comparative Study 186-87 (2000) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law
School) (on file with the International Law Library, Harvard University).
27 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908)
(examining the emergence and development of mechanical legal doctrine.)
28 The nadir of mechanical jurisprudence is reached when conceptions are
used, not as premises from which to reason, but as ultimate solutions. So used,
they cease to be conceptions and become empty words. Id. at 620.
29 See generally AFTER, supra note 21 (introducing the concept of development
theory).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Pound, supra note 18.
33 Id.
See also Amr Shalakany, supra note 26; Duncan Kennedy, Two
Globalizationsof Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 631, 631
(2003) (positing that "critical legal studies as a legal academic school of thought is
very much alive, and has an analysis to contribute.., to the part of the
intelligentsia of peripheral countries that is interested in left/modernist/postmodernist critiques of the current world system.").
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abilities in the demos after the imposition of market oriented
reforms ostensibly in the name of democracy. 34 If we identify the
cause of the distortion, then, like Pound, we will set ourselves the
task of suggesting a possible solution. I suggest in this article that
the conception of the rule of law as deployed by IDAs is
responsible for the systematic emptying of democracy.
As a solution, I suggest a conception of rule of law that does
not entail a valuation of a society's economic and political system a
priori. 35 At the same time, such a conception of the rule of law
must be one that does not act merely as a restraint on government
power so as to create space for those with other kinds of power political and economic-to steamroll the rest of society. 36 To cast
this negative aspiration of the rule of law in terms comprehensible
to Roscoe Pound, I am interested in a conception of rule of law that
does not inhibit the deployment of the antiformalist social in the
34 Witness the number of democracy assistance and Rule of Law projects by
international development institutions and donors, all aimed at establishing
viable democracies in developing countries and transitional economies. See
generally THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOcRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE
(1999) (describing the growth of Western aid for democratic building in
developing countries).
35 As John Ohnesorge points out, this is the "jurisprudential" meaning of the
term. It takes the rule of law as a set of ideals for the administration of justice and
not as shorthand for a statutory regime that protects property rights and the
market, and as limitation on government discretion. See John K.M. Ohnesorge,
The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and the Developmental States of Northeast
Asia, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 91, 112 (Christoph
Antons ed., 2003) (concluding that the "Rule of Law" can have different meanings
to different professions and in different parts of the world).
36 Professor James Gathii has noted that often well-intentioned "good
governance" reforms only end up redefining the nature of the corruption being
practiced in an economy rather than control the corruption itself. Professor Gathii
has argued that:

One of the good governance proposals designed to eradicate corruption
is the deregulation of the economy. One assumption underlying the
proposal that deregulation can act as an antidote to corruption is that it
would reduce the scope of official discretion and therefore opportunities
for corruption.
Rather than reducing corruption, however, recent
research evidence on deregulation and liberalization in South Korea and
China has shown how these reforms redefined corrupt relationships
away from those initiated and controlled by state actors to those initiated
and controlled by private actors. Sub-Saharan African economies are no
exceptions. In other words, deregulation and liberalization in those
contexts succeeded in privatizing, not reducing corruption. Rolling back
the state in the economy only displaces corruption from the state to the
marketplace.
Gathii, Retelling Good Governance,supra note 12, at 1033.
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redistributive or altruistic function of law and government. 37
3.

THE RULE OF LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT AND
MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS

In this section, I would like to very briefly build the context in
which IDAs prescribe the rule of law as an antidote to corruption
and sine qua non to market oriented reforms in developing
countries. This is important because this background will enable
us to understand some of the claims about the rule of law
discourse that I make later on in this article.
We should understand the "revival of rule of law" in the
context of two other concepts commonly associated with it.38
These are democracy and free markets. 39 The fundamental
message of neoliberal political economy has been summarized
thus: in settling matters of resource allocation, imperfect markets
are better than imperfect states. 40 The general argument is that a
comparison between the welfare loss from the imperfect market
and the welfare gain from the intervention aimed at correcting the
particular distortion yields a negative outcome. 41 This is because
the government intervention does not only have direct costs in
37 See Pound, supra note 18 (discussing the antiformalist social conception).
38 The language of "revival of rule of law" is from Thomas Carothers. See

Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (1998) (discussing
the revival of the rule of law in China). As noted in note I supra, enthusiasm with
rule of law is a revival because there was similar enthusiasm in the first wave of
law and development movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This
enthusiasm ebbed in the early 1970s. See, e.g., Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in
Development: On Tapping, Gourding,and Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 167 (1997) (tracing the growth of the law and development field); David M.
Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 Wis. L. REV. 1062 (1974)
(understanding the role of law and development in academia).
39 Jedediah Purdy has elegantly called these associations "the harmony of
liberal ends." Purdy has written that:
This is the conviction that the features of liberal modernity, as it has
developed in the North Atlantic countries -markets economics, liberal
democracy or at least the rule of law, the loosening of cultural traditions,
tolerance within societies, and peaceable coexistence among themreinforce and even produce each other.
Jebediah Purdy, A World Of Passions: How To Think About Globalization Now, 11
IND. J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (2004).
40 Christopher Colclough, Structuralism versus Neo-liberalism: An Introduction,
in STATES OR MARKETS? NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT POLIcY DEBATE 1,
7-8 (Christopher Colclough & James Manor eds., 1999).
41 Id. at 8-9.
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terms of wages and salaries of the employees of the intervening
bureaucratic agency.42 Additionally, neoliberals point to two
indirect costs associated with government failure. One is that
government intervention distorts the relative prices elsewhere in
the economy consequent upon, for example, the revenue raising
measures to finance the intervention. 43 Two, the intervention
creates "scarcity rent" which is the:
difference between the value of an imported good at world
prices converted through an equilibrium exchange rate and
its costs in terms of the over-valued domestic currency.
This difference accrues to the license holder as a windfall
gain.
Capturing such rents becomes the object of
competition within and without the bureaucracy, and thus
the locus for a range of directly unproductive activities
which secure remuneration but produce nothing and use
up real resources. 44
Given the rise of neoliberalism after 1980, the neoliberals were
anxious to institute their preference of market failures to
government failures in development policy. 45 In doing this, the
neo-liberals deployed the language and images of reducing the
economic role of the state in the market. 46 In fact, the shift in
42 Id.
43 See generally Lal, supra note 8 (assessing the academic understanding of
developing countries' economies).
44 Colclough supra note 40, at 14. See also Anne Krueger, The PoliticalEconomy
of a Rent-Seekinq Society, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 491 (1974) (developing "a simple
model of competitive rent seeking for the important case when rents originate
from quantitative restrictions on international trade").
45 See generally Lal, supra note 8 (looking at the characteristics of good
government); Anne Krueger, Theory and Practice of Commercial Policy: 1945-1990
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3569) (1990). For
example, arguing against the "infant industry" justification for governmental
intervention, Krueger argues that "the likelihood that a 'small' distortion or
market failure can be corrected by government action is low because any such
action is likely to be accompanied by larger government failure." Id. at 22.
46 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1991: THE CHALLENGE
OF DEVELOPMENT 9 (1991) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT]
(advocating a "minimalist" state). The World Bank writes:

The approach to development that seems to have worked most reliably,
and which seems to offer most promise, suggests a reappraisal of the
respective roles for the market and the state. Put simply, governments
need to do less in those areas where markets work, or can be made to
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preference of market failures to government failures was
implemented by redrawing the axis that separates the market from
the state. 47 However, in reality, there are two big questions here
that are often collapsed into one in academic literature. For a
proper understanding of the rule of law as an institution that is
central to market oriented reforms, we need to conceptually
distinguish these two questions: (1) to what extent is it necessary
to roll back the state and reduce its role in the economy in
developing countries?; and (2) what instruments are appropriate to
accomplish the task of rolling back the state and reducing its role in
the economy?
The first issue is that the government had to be reduced in size,
and its role in the economy had to be equally minimized. 48 So the
exact question would be to what extent need the state be rolled
back? Responses abound and different people within the same
agency differ on the answer they give, and the same agencies give
different answers at different times.49 To give an example, the
work ....
Id.
47 Before 1980, IDAs took it for granted that, at least in the developing world,
government failure was better than market failure. As such, most development
and reform efforts were concentrated on public investments in which the
government played a key role. This changed after 1980 when IDAs started
concentrating on the costs of governmental intervention. Professor Jeswald W.
Salacuse has also written on this shift which he identifies as a shift from "Model I"
of development to "Model II." See, e.g., Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing
Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the Third World, 33 INT'L
LAW. 875, 876 (Winter 1999) (arguing that many developing nations have
embraced evolving models to reach developmental goals since the 1980s).
Professor Salacuse writes:

Until the 1980s, most developing country governments, with a few
exceptions, as well as many international organizations, had in mind a
similar model of the development process as they went about their work.
That model of how development goals should be attained greatly
influenced government policies and institutions. It also profoundly
affected national legal systems and the way government officials,
lawyers, and legal scholars thought about law and its role in
development. Since the late 1980s, most developing countries, in varying
degrees, have abandoned that first model of development (Development
Model I) and have evolved a new model (Development Model II) that
supersedes it.
Id. at 876.
48 See supra notes 40 and 46 and accompanying text.
49 Despite the temptation to see most IDAs as monoliths with singular
positions on issues, in truth they often differ wildly on micro issues. This makes a
discussion of why, despite such ostensible differences among them, IDAs seem to
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World Bank has shifted its position on the extent to which the state
needs to be rolled back three times in the course of the immediate
past decade. First, of course, the Bank espoused the concept of the
"developmental state" through the 1980s. 50 From its notion of the
"developmental state," the World Bank evolved the concept of a
"minimalist state" in the early 1990s. 51 In the face of mounting
pressure and criticisms, the World Bank changed its language
52
barely a year later to embrace the language of an "effective state."
Presently, with critiques focusing on the association of "effective
state" with domination by the state, the World Bank talks of the
"capability" of the state -the need to match the size of the state to
53
its capability.
The first fundamental debate has two aspects to it. First, are
the welfare gains of government intervention outweighed by the
Proponents of the "market
costs of such intervention?
imperfection thesis" point to market failures and say that it is

use a rather stable package of reforms under widely accepted programs such as
Rule of Law projects. For a look at the World Bank's many uses of the term "rule
of law," see Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law" in Economic
Development (paper presented at the Law and Development Conference, Cornell
Law School, April 2004) (copy on file with the author).
50 See supra text accompanying note 47. For a comprehensive account of how
the "developmental state" was responsible for accelerating economic
development in Northeast Asia, see ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET:
ECONOMIc

THEORY

AND

THE

ROLE

OF

GOVERNMENT

IN

EAST

ASIAN

INDUSTRIALIZATION 34 (1990).
46.
In 1997, World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn, in the foreword to
the World Development Report wrote:
51 WORLD BANK, CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note
52

Far from supporting a minimalist approach to the state, [successful
development stories] have shown that development requires an effective
state, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role, encouraging and
complementing the activities of private businesses and individuals.
1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING
WORLD iii, iii-iv (1997) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997].
53 See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1998/99:
KNOWLEDGE FOR DEVELOPMENT 130-156 (1999) [hereinafter WORLD BANK,
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1998/99] (defining the World Bank's objective as the
development of a "dynamic knowledge management system capable of distilling
knowledge" and effectively making it available by "building the capability in
developing countries to assess and adapt relevant policy and technical knowledge
to local situations"). The view expressed here is that states need to tailor their
activities to their own capability. The practical effect is to counsel governments of
developing countries from taking on "welfare functions" since these governments
do not have the "capability" to superintend such functions.
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
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much more pervasive than advocates for free markets admit.5 4 On
the other hand, proponents of the government failure thesis (who
are the advocates for free markets) point to the three types of costs
of government intervention outlined above to make the argument
55
that government failure is much more costly than market failures.
Within the prevailing neo-liberal discourse, this fundamental
debate is bracketed and avoided.56 Despite the raging controversy
and the fact that social scientists are sharply divided on the point,
it is simply assumed in the development discourse that market
failures are better than government failures. As three development
scholars remarked in the early 1990s: "As the 1990s begin, the
development debate has all but disappeared in the West.
Monumental changes in Eastern Europe and Latin America are
widely interpreted as proof of the superiority of development
models that are led by the private sector and oriented toward
exports." 57
However, even the acceptance that market failures are better
than government failures leaves open another fundamental issue.
m A variant of this argument would posit that some of the basic ideas
underpinning the market model are simply not true. For example, studies have
shown that firms dealing with each other for a significant period of time
eventually abandon the impersonality and autonomy of the market and instead
establish relatively durable relationships based on moral standards of trust and
fairness, not law. See, e.g., Ronald Dore, Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism,
34 BRIT. J.Soc. 459 (1983) (questioning the divide between goodwill and selfinterest by examining the collaboration between firms and mills in Japan when
considering a standing relationship over a period of time); Mark Granovetter,
Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC.
481 (1985) (examining the extent to which social relations affect institutions and
"economic actions"); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) (finding that businessmen rarely
resort to legal sanctions when settling disputes).
55 See WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1998/99, supra note 53, at 7-8
(listing the three factors and discussing what governments should do).
56 See, e.g., Paul Streeten, Markets and States: Against Minimalism, 21 WORLD
DEV. 1281 (1993) (making an argument in favor of a "strong" state and critiquing
the most compelling arguments in favor of a reduction in the role of states in
economic functioning, which are: the notion of price distortions, of inherently
inefficient public enterprise, of an unambiguous dividing line between the public
and the private sectors, and of statism as inherently rent-seeking).
57 Robin Broad et al., Development:
The Market is not Enough, in
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH

392, 392 (Jeffry A. Frieden & David A. Lake eds., 4th ed. 2000). The authors cite
World Bank President Barber Conable as saying, "If I were to characterize the past
decade, the most remarkable thing was the generation of a global consensus that
market forces and economic efficiency were the best way to achieve the kind of
growth which is the best antidote to poverty." Id.
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What instruments are appropriate for reducing the economic role
of the government? The answer to this question depends to a large
extent on the nature of prior government intervention. However,
eventually all prescribed solutions for minimizing the role of the
state in the economy end up with suggestions of the institutional
adjustments required to effect the changes. This issue has some
ramifications for the role of the law, and for the separation of
power between the different branches of the government. One
suggested way of resolving the arising issues is to create an
enabling atmosphere where the rule of law is clearly established, in
58
order to allow private development to continue.
Hence, the rule of law is offered as one of the institutional
mechanisms in which the state cedes its economic role to the
market.5 9 Since under the rule of law, individuals can best express
their choices through the market, individual freedom and
prosperity are also simultaneously maximized. 60 This complex
relationship between economic development, political freedom,
and the rule of law has found increasing but vague consensus in
61
the language of "good governance."
Good governance is defined in terms of institutions that
establish predictable, impartial, and consistently enforced rules for
FROM PLAN TO
58 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996:
MARKET 87 (1996) (discussing the necessity of creating frameworks of law in order

to move forward with private development).
59 See id. at 144 (arguing that the rule of law is not only imperative in
designing good laws, but also in providing a means for the government to signal
the private sector; a government that is "re-tooling" itself by reducing its
involvement in the economy signals to the private sector that it is serious about
reforms by adopting the rule of law).
60 In this way, neo-liberalism weds political economy and economics. Neoliberals follow Hayek's lead. Hayek argues that the market is a spontaneously
ordered institution and is not a product of human design. Human beings as
rational economic actors convey information about the choices and the quality of
goods in the marketplace through the laws of supply and demand as equilibrated
by the price mechanism. As such, all decisions on the economy should be left to
individual units. When the government withdraws from making economic
decisions, the powers of officialdom are necessarily circumscribed, hence
increasing individual freedom. Since the individual units are the best judges of
their economic needs, government withdrawal also enhances efficiency. See
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM (1944) (arguing that important
societal goals can only be achieved through a system that maximizes individual
freedom).
61 James Thuo Gathii, Representations of Afica in Good Governance Discourse:
Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 1998-1999 THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUD. 65, 65 (1999) [hereinafter Gathii, Representations].
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investors. 62 In most World Bank publications, governance is
thought of as having five critical institutional dimensions: (i) the
executive; (ii) the bureaucracy; (iii) the rule of law; (iv) the
63
character of the policy-making process; and (v) the civil society.
Corresponding with each of these institutional dimensions of
good governance, there is a characteristic that is defined as "good
governance." Respectively, these are as follows: (i) an executive
that is accountable for its actions; 64 (ii) a bureaucracy whose
professional standards are high; 65 (iii) a legal framework that is
66
appropriate to the circumstances and command broad consensus;
(iv) an open and transparent policy making process; 67 (v) a strong
68
civil society capable of participating in governance.
These institutional dimensions and their corresponding
characteristics of good governance can be tabulated as follows:
Institutional dimension of
governance
The Executive
The Bureaucracy
Rule of Law
Policy Making
Civil Society

Good governance characteristic
Accountability for its actions
High Professional Standards
Appropriate Framework
Transparency
"Strong" Civil Society

Though the rule of law is identified in this list as only one of
the five institutional mechanisms of good governance that
underpin market democracy, it would appear that there are two
notions of rule of law operating here. For each of the five
62 WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE vii (1994)
[hereinafter WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE].
63 Id.; see also Nauro F. Campos & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Development Performance
and the Institutions of Governance: Evidence from East Asia and Latin America, 27
WORLD DEV. 439, 439-440 (1999) (outlining the same five characteristics as critical
institutional dimensions); Nauro F. Campos, Context Is Everything: Measuring
Institutional Change in Transition Economies, (World Bank Working Paper No. 2269,
1999) (using the five institutional dimensions of governance for data collection
purposes and indicators in mapping institution building during the transition
from centrally planned to market economies).
64 Campos & Nugent, Development Performance,supra note 63, at 439.
65 Id. at 439-440.
66 Id. at 440.
67 Id.
68

Id.
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institutional mechanisms, it would seem that the value of
subjecting all actions of all officials to the laid down rules is prime
- in the same way as the consistent, fair application of these
rules.69 It is only by the application of consistent, clear rules
knowable in advance that each of the five institutions can work. 70
As I will indicate shortly, this is in fact one of the three definitions
of the rule of law: the procedural notion of applying clear laws,
interpreted by an independent judiciary and consistently enforced
71
by an impartial executive.
At the same time however, there is the even more specific and
substantive notion of rule of law that is identified as the third
institution (itemized as number (iii) above), and whose
corresponding "good" quality the World Bank identifies as a legal
framework that is "appropriate to the circumstances and adhered
to by members of both the private and public sectors." 72 This is the
second notion of the rule of law that is operating in this fivecriterion institutional design for good governance. I will explain
below that this conflation of the two notions of rule of law plays an
important part in justifying economic reforms that may be devoid
of democratic content, while satisfying the outward structural
criteria of "participation" and "broad consensus." An argument
that I wish to flag here is that the function of fracturing
"governance" into five institutional mechanisms actually serves
three distinct but related purposes.
First, the new language of "good governance" provides an
idiom through which various interventions and debates can be
carried out in the public and private arena that would otherwise be
questionable. 73 By inventing categories such as governance, which
69 The World Bank notes: "There is a tension in the development of the
modern state between ensuring that public officials have sufficient power to
deliver good governance and ensuring that they are constrained from using this
power arbitrarily in the interests of the privileged few." WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 99 (2002).
70 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule Of Law" As A Concept In Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 37 (1997) (averring that people must know of the
law in advance in order to consider legal consequences before their actions).
71 See infra Section 4.
72 Campos & Nugent, supra note 63, at 439.
73 1 track Arturo Escobar's seminal argument about development providing a
series of categories that justify particular interventions in the Third World. See
generally ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD (Sherry B. Ortner et al. eds., 1995) (demonstrating
how development discourse and practice can become a mechanism of control,
influencing both social and economic realities).
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command some form of consensus (since everyone supports "good
governance"), it becomes possible for IDAs to intervene even in
areas that would have seemed off-limits in an earlier era. James
Gathii has described this consensus as:
a product of a heterogeneous coalition of forces that include
international financial institutions, western countries, and a
variety of private actors. Although this diverse range of
entities proceeds from specific, and at times contradictory,
interests and orientations, in good governance they find a
common way of framing the relationship between
economic development and political freedom. 74
Second, it is much more possible to obfuscate the real role that
each of the entities and concepts play in deciding the allocation of
resources in the economy by dissembling governance into five
In particular, it completely
constituent institutional parts.
obfuscates the role (and meaning) of the rule of law and its
relationship with participation and democracy. This is done, as I
pointed out above, by conflating the operation of two distinct
notions of rule of law -a procedural and a substantive conception.
I pick up this theme in the subsequent sections of this article. 75
Third, the fracturing of governance into five constituent pieces
also obfuscates the fact that the language of reducing the size of the
government might well mean redirecting the state. 76 For example,
by creating an institution called the bureaucracy as distinct from
the executive, the real agenda is to transfer decisionmaking
abilities from the political organs of the state to the more
technocratic organs. 77 In actuality, the state has not been "rolled
back" at all, but the reorientation of activities that bear on
allocation of resources from the political organs to the technocratic
74

Gathii, Representations, supranote 61, at 65.

75 See infra Sections 4-5.
76 See Nicholas Hildyard, The Myth of the Minimalist State: Free Market
at
available
05,
Briefing
House
Comer
Ambiguities,
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/item.shtml?x=51960 (last visited on Oct. 31,
2005) (asserting that the free market agenda that ostensibly aims to "strip down"
excessive state involvement in the economy and in society often results merely in
a redirection of power and spending that has largely benefited the private sector).
77 See TIM LANG & COLIN HINES, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: PROTECTING THE
FUTURE AGAINST FREE TRADE 25 (1993) (arguing that free trade advocates

reorganize bureaucracies, and do not minimize them).
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organs give the impression that the overt regulation of the
economy by state officials has ended. 78 In reality, however, the
transfer of decisionmaking from the executive to the bureaucrat
only has the impact of depoliticizing debates on the allocation of
resources in the society. 79 The assumption is that the bureaucrats
are more able to make decisions using the efficiency criterion and
without undue attention to "uneconomic concerns" that may lie at
the forefront of the minds of politicians. 80
However, this analysis glosses over the fact that, at the heart of
the debate, the real issue is regulation. Properly conceived,
regulation is a power struggle:
some win, others lose.
Dissembling governance into different constituent parts achieves
regulation, but without engaging in the messy politics of losers and
winners. 81 The rule of law legitimates this process by providing a
neutral, and transparent process through which these decisions are
taken, thereby ruling out "bias" that would be contested and
perhaps reversed in the political process. The analysis of the rule
of law below would show that, far from playing this role, the rule
of law complements the process of depoliticizing key decisions in
the economy by insulating them from politics. 82 At the same time,
78

Id.

See id. (noting that the first wave of privatization occurred in profitable
segments). See generally Nicholas Hildyard, The World Bank and the State: A Recipe
for Change?, at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?cmd[126]=x126-16241 (claiming that this transfer in power serves only to redirect attention
and does not substantially change the process).
79

80 WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE,

supra note 62, at 9.

For example, the World Bank, in its 1997 World Development Report, wrote
that different constituencies in a country need to be persuaded that neo-liberal
reforms are beneficial through consensus building. The Bank implies that the
reforms as drawn should not be debated at all-a reform-minded government
only needs to persuade sectors that maybe opposed to the reforms. The Bank
suggests a "political cost-benefit approach" to assess the redistribution and
efficiency implications of reforms and set out how different groups are likely to
react to reforms. WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, supra note 52, at 146,
154.
82 Helen O'Connel reports the results of this process thus:
81

The economic reforms have had the effect of devaluing politicians and
political processes as more and more important decisions are taken
outside Southern countries.... Elected politicians have less and less
authority or capacity to decide on national priorities. Ironically, this has
facilitated the entrenchment of power in the hands of rich elites; it has
reinforced cronyism in some countries and the trade in political and
economic patronage. The result is increasing alienation of women and
men from political processes.
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however, the democratic ideal of "participation" is retained.
This analysis impugns the oft-repeated association between
"market-oriented" regimes and democracy. 83 Thus the property of
an economic system being democratic does not depend on whether
or not it is "market-oriented." Rather, it depends on whether the
system operates to distribute the resources in the economy in a
way that is acceptable to the great majority of the people in that
society. 84 Since oppression and injustice can be generated both by
market mechanisms that fail to curb power and economic
inequalities (as Roscoe Pound complained8 5) and by repressive
state agencies, whether or not an economic system is compatible
with democracy is a question that is distinct from the dominant
86
mode of decisionmaking in that economy.
4.

THE RULE OF LAW DEFINED

There are two common definitions of the institution of rule of
law: the formal conception and the substantive conception. 87 The
HELEN O'CONNELL, EQUALITY POSTPONED: GENDER, RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT

120

(1996).
83

See, e.g., John Williamson, Democracy and the "Washington Consensus," 21

WORLD DEV. 1329 (1993) (discussing the merits of consensus regarding economic

ideology among democratic political leaders).
84 This way of gauging the democratic content of an economic system would
accord with the definition of "substantive" democracy that I adopt below.
85 Pound, supra note 18.
86 For excellent accounts of how the market economy functions to reproduce
the command economy in the wake of "market-oriented" reforms in developing
countries and transitional economies, see generally James Thuo Gathii, Good
Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social
Projects in International Law, 5 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 107 (1999) [hereinafter
Gathii, Good Governance] (critiquing the effect of the role of the World Bank on
human rights advocacy); Gathii, Representations, supra note 61 (studying the
imposition of good governance proposals on African countries, and arguing that
such proposals contain many shortcomings); James Thuo Gathii, Corruption and
Donor Reforms: Expanding the Promises and Possibilitiesof the Rule of Law as an AntiCorruption Strategy in Kenya 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 407 (1999) [hereinafter Gathii,
Corruption](discussing various anti-corruption initiatives in Kenya that have been
required as part of the rule of law reforms of donors). In this series of articles,
Professor Gathii argues that by targeting the "social" as represented by
governmental regulation in developing countries, market-oriented reforms also
end up disabling and stigmatizing protective governmental capacity to enhance
social justice. The result is that the proposals for reform that are advocated (such
as human rights enforcement, anti-corruption measures, Rule of Law projects,
etc.) are often ineffective because they cannot challenge the structural relations of
wealth and power that underlie distributional outcomes in national and
international society.
87 Radin, supra note 7, at 783.
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World Bank has recently sought to add a third meaning that it
identifies as a "functional" definition. 88 In this section, I will first
discuss the different aspects of the two original meanings. I will
then demonstrate that the third conception, preferred and used by
the World Bank, is, in fact, not a principled third conception of the
term but a conflation of the first two meanings. I will draw
illustrations from Rule of Law projects by the World Bank and
other IDAs to show this conflation in practice.
My argument is as follows: far from being a mere conceptual
confusion, this conflation between procedural and substantive
aspects of the rule of law actually plays a vital role in preferring
and sustaining particular legal and economic reforms. I will show
that such a conflation enables the deployment of the rule of law as
a "thick concept -one that has both a descriptive and an
evaluative property. 89 The deployment of the rule of law as a thick
concept operates to justify particular substantive programmatic
reforms while maintaining a standard rhetoric of procedural
necessity that is easily agreed upon politically. The outcome, then,
is that the rule of law is used to justify reforms that are at the same
time more substantive (and ideologically particularistic) and
narrower in scope in some areas of reform than one would
The Rule of Law projects of IDAs,
immediately recognize.
therefore, end up entrenching substantive inequality in economic
and political relations. At the same time, they create categories
through which such substantive outcomes can easily be justified by
regimes that put in place the programmatic reforms favored by
these agencies but whose general impact is to harm the welfare of
88 World Bank, The Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy,
[hereinafter
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/ruleoflaw2.htm
World Bank, Rule of Law] (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
89 1 borrow the term "thick concept" from philosophy. Although even in
philosophy the exact nature of a thick concept is heavily contested, there is some
agreement about the properties of thick concepts that I am referring to here. The
best examples of thick concepts given in philosophy include honesty, compassion,
and rudeness. The essential characteristic of such concepts is that they combine
both description and evaluation. I further explore this meaning and the
implications of accusing development agencies of using the rule of law as a thick
concept below. Contemporary philosophers who have turned their attention to
thick concepts as a means of understanding perspectivism, relativism, objectivity,
and universal values include, notably, Bernard Williams, Simon Blackburn, and
John McDowell. See generally, BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF
PHILOSOPHY (1985) (explaining many of the flaws of modem moral philosophy);
Simon Blackburn, Through Thick and Thin, 66 PRoc. ARISTOTELIAN SOc'Y SuPP. 285
(1992) (discussing thick and thin concepts); John McDowell, Critical Notice, 95
MIND 377 (1986) (analyzing Williams' ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY).
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society at large.

4.1. The Proceduralor Formal Conception of the Rule of Law
The World Bank defines the formal conception of the rule of
law as follows:
Formal definitions of the rule of law look to the presence or
absence of specific, observable criteria of the law or the
legal system.
Common criteria include:
a formally
independent and impartial judiciary; laws that are public;
the absence of laws that apply only to particular
individuals or classes; the absence of retroactive laws; and
provisions for judicial review of government action. There
is no definitive list of formal criteria, and different formal
definitions may use different standards. What formal
definitions have in common is that the "rule of law" is
measured by the conformity of the legal system to these
explicit standards. 90
The former World Bank General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata
subscribed to this definition of the rule of law. 91 Shihata set out the
following as requisites for a functioning rule of law: (i) a set of
rules known in advance; (ii) rules that are actually in force; (iii)
mechanisms to ensure proper application of rules but that allow
controlled departure when deemed necessary; (iv) the existence of
an independent judicial or arbitral body to make binding decisions
when conflicts in application of rules arise; and (v) procedures for
92
amending rules.
The World Bank argues further that since the formal
conception must always be saddled with the need to correlate the
formal characteristics with particular substantive outcomes, the
formal conception is actually only a pretext for a substantive or
functional conception.93 In reaching this conclusion, the World
94
Bank uses Lon Fuller's understanding of the function of the law.
90

World Bank, Rule of Law, supra note 88.

91 IBRAHIM SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 85

(Franziska

Tschofen & Antonio R. Parra eds., 1991).
92 Id. at 85.
93 Id.
94

See World Bank, Rule of Law, supra note 88 (citing Lon Fuller's book

expressly and listing it as a reference); see also LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
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However, the World Bank turns the criticisms that are usually
levied against Lon Fuller's argument about law and morality on
their head. 95 Critics of Fuller allege that his conception of law and
morality enables him to insulate his preferred notion of morality
within his understanding of the law. 96 However, the World Bank
argues that, in fact, it is the formal conception of rule of law that
ends up imbuing the law with a particular substantive content that
is nevertheless not acknowledged:
What we really should be interested in -that is, the essence
of the rule of law - is the substantive or functional outcome.
Whether or not the formal characteristics contribute to that
outcome ought to be a matter for research, not
presumption. This suggests that the "objectivity" of the
formal criteria may be illusory, since they are selected
through subjective (and perhaps culturally biased)
assumptions about the actual effect of the rules in
question. 97
I will first outline the other two conceptions of the rule of law,
and will then turn back to this criticism of the formal conception of
the rule of law levied by the World Bank.

(Rev. ed. 1964) (discussing law and morality).
95 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law, in ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 343 (1983) (critiquing Fuller's book, the main
theme of which he describes as the definition of law as the purposive subjection of
men to governance by rules); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION
(1997) (studying the role of judicial lawmaking in the United States). The debate
between Lon Fuller and his critics usually revolves around his unique
understanding of law as a "purposive activity." However, this characterization is
often misleading. The real issue is whether the purposes that law should achieve
should be "extra-legal" or not. Hart's argument is that politicians, moralists, and
philosophers should decide the substantive aims of the law and that law can be
used as a means to implement those extra-legal aims. However, this does not turn
law into a moral entity. Once the extra-legal aims are decided, law achieves these
aims in a morally-neutral way. This concept seems to posit a sharp distinction
between law as a means of achieving some end and law as an end in and of itself.
Fuller's position is that though the law acts merely as a means, it eventually forms
an "internal morality." The impact of this is that it becomes difficult to separate
the means from the end, and that this unique combination of means and ends is
what can be loosely called "internal morality" of the law.
96 HART, supra note 95, at 347-353.
97 World Bank, Rule of Law, supra note 88,
7.
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4.2. The Substantive Conception of the Rule of Law
The World Bank defines the substantive conception of the rule
of law as follows:
An alternative to the formal approach to the rule of law is
one that looks to substantive outcomes such as "justice" or
"fairness." This approach is not concerned with the formal
rules, except inasmuch as they contribute to the
achievement of a particular substantive goal of the legal
system. Unlike the formal approach, which eschews value
judgments, the substantive approach is driven by a moral
vision of the good legal system, and measures the rule of
law in terms of how well the system being assessed
98
approximates this ideal.
This "substantive conception" denies that a separation between
the rule of law and the substantive values promoted by the law is
possible. 99 It sees certain ideas of freedom, rights, and justice as
integral components of the rule of law. 100 It is quite easy to criticize
this conception of the rule of law if it underlies reform
requirements imposed by international development agencies. A
definition of the rule of law that has substantive content imbued in
it also prescribes a philosophy of the good society. 10 1 Hence, it
sneaks in (via legal institutions) substantive moral and political
decisions without political debate and consensus. For example,
Harold Berman insists that the rule of law requires laws to be
98

Id.

8 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)).

99 Id.
100 See Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An
Analytical Framework, 1997 PUBLIC LAW 467 (distinguishing between formal and
substantive conceptions of the rule of law; summarizing the substantive conception
articulated by Ronald Dworkin, Sir John Laws, and Trevor Allan).
101By "philosophy of the good," I am referring loosely to the values that a
society holds as reflected in its laws, politics, culture, economy, and in the
distribution of political, social, and economic power within that society. By
values, I am referring to "the conceptions that people [in a given society] hold of

what is good and bad in human life." ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES:
A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 59 (1990). 1 have added the bracketed phrase in order to
highlight the objections of critical legal studies scholars that it is in fact impossible
to craft a neutral legislative process capable of unearthing a "philosophy of the
good" that is truly representative of a given society's values. See, e.g., ROBERTO
UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY:

TOWARDS A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 180

(1976) (arguing that no legislative process can be deemed neutral).
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grounded in a "normative foundation" that transcends the legal
The difficulty is that such a "normative
system itself.102
foundation" can only be determined by the polity using values that
the polity considers itself worthy of respect and protection through
the rule of law. This makes it impossible to define a "minimalist"
rule of law that must be present in all countries in substantive
03
terms.1
The World Bank acknowledges this major problem with the
substantive conception of the rule of law. The World Bank states
three drawbacks of this conception of the rule of law:
But this explicit link between the rule of law and some
conception of substantive goodness has drawbacks. First,
and most obviously, determining how "just" a particular
legal order is requires a subjective - and extremely
complex-judgment call. Second, defining the rule of law
as a "good" legal system risks making the concept so vague
that it's not very useful. Why should we bother talking
102 HAROLD

J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION:

WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION

THE FORMATION

OF THE

292-94 (1983) (explaining the value of societal

standards vis-A-vis the "rule of law").
103 However, Randall Peerenboom seems to make the opposite argument.
Peerenboom first distinguishes between "thin" and "thick" theories of the rule of
law. According to Peerenboom, a "thin" theory stresses the formal and
instrumental aspects of the rule of law. Peerenboom's "thin" conception of the
rule of law would roughly correspond with the "formal" definition I explained
above. According to Peerenboom, a "thick" theory, on the other hand, begins
with the basic elements of a thick conception and then incorporates elements of
political morality such as particular economic arrangements, forms of
government, etc. Peerenboom argues that "there are no freestanding thin rule of
law legal systems that exist independently of a particular political, economic,
social, and cultural context." Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers
Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MIcH. J.
INT'L L. 471, 485 (2002). My argument on the "thick conception" of the rule of law
that I present below differs slightly from Peerenboom's usage of "thick" theory.
Peerenboom argues that it is impossible to have a "thin" conception of the rule of
law; that in reality "thin" conceptions often dissolve into "thick" conceptions. A
"thick" conception, therefore, necessarily begins with a "thin" conception and
then builds substantive values into it. Using Peerenboom's taxonomy, the import
of my arguments below would be that IDAs can only rightfully nudge developing
countries to install rule of law in its "thin" conception, while letting the local
politics, economic conditions, cultural values, etc. of these countries provide the
"thick" conceptions which fill in the rule of law to make it wholesome. Rather
than do this, I argue that IDAs purport to install the rule of law in its "thin"
conception while in fact requiring the installation of a particular instantiation of
the rule of law "thickly" conceived.
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about whether a society has or doesn't have the "rule of
law" when what we really are asking is whether the society
is good or not? Third, the relationship between law and
societal outcomes is problematic in the substantive
definition. It is conceivable that there could be a society
that had unjust law, or no law at all, and yet achieved
substantive justice according to the normative criteria
selected. On the other hand, one could imagine a society
that had normatively perfect law and legal institutions, but
where law was marginal to the point of irrelevance in
actual social life, and where social outcomes tended to be
normatively bad. Which society has more rule of law from
the substantive perspective? Is it the law that must be
good, or the social outcomes? If the former, then don't all
the problems with the formal definition apply? If the latter,
why talk about law at all? 10 4

4.3. The FunctionalConception of the Rule of Law
As a result, the World Bank seems to prefer a "functional"
conception of the rule of law. It defines the functional conception
as follows:
The functional definition of the rule of law is broadly
consistent with the traditional meaning of the English
phrase, which has usually been contrasted with "rule of
man." It has the advantage, too, of defining the rule of law
according to outcome-related criteria, but not requiring a
moral verdict on the desirability of that outcome. The
functional definition is narrow enough that it does not
overlap with other more general concepts, and it makes
questions as to the relationship of formal characteristics to
the rule of law, and of the rule of law to substantive goals,
researchable rather than tautological.10 5
Even then, the World Bank recognizes several problems with
this conception of the rule of law. It enumerates them thus:
World Bank, Rule of Law, supra note 88
105 Id. at 12.
104
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Nonetheless, the functional definition suffers from a
First, as with the substantive
number of difficulties.
definition, the relationship between the legal system per se
and the functional goal can pose problems. It is possible to
constrain government officials or realize predictability
through means other than the legal system. Suppose one
society has less official discretion than its neighbor even
though the latter has apparently more restrictive laws.
Which enjoys a greater rule of law under a functional
definition? Another problem is the fact that looking at
"predictability" or "official constraint" or any other
function makes it hard to make any definitive statement
about the level of rule of law in a whole society.
Government officials may make literally thousands of
decisions each day in a given system. Some of them may be
highly constrained, while others are not. It is not at all clear
how to aggregate the levels of discretion for individual
types of decisions into an overall measure of the rule of
law.

An additional point that the functional definition illustrates
most strongly is that, despite contemporary rhetoric, there
is no a priori reason to believe that the rule of law (defined
functionally or formally) is necessarily always a good
thing.106

5.

THE RULE OF LAW IN "RULE OF LAW PROJECTS" BY

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES: A FOURTH MEANING

Let us get back to a definition of the rule of law that would act
as our prototype in this discussion. I adopt here the "formal"
definition by William Whitford. 10 7 He defines the rule of law as
"the accountability of transparent government decisions [including
judicial responses to private law suits] to predetermined standards
applied by an independent body, probably a court, through a
13-14.
Id. at
William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law: New Reflections on an Old Doctrine, 6
E. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. & PEACE 157 (2002).
106
107
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procedure that can be practically utilized by the aggrieved." 108
According to Whitford, there are three conditions which are
essential to the actualization of the rule of law. 10 9 These conditions
are:
Transparency:
This is the requirement that the
predetermined standards against which governments are to
be measured must be "pre-announced and publicly
available;"11 0

Access to justice: There must be widespread access to justice.
This implies that "persons aggrieved, either by government
action or the wrongful action of another person, have the
practical ability to bring a complaint to some agency,
usually a court, that will assess the consistency of the action
with the law;"' and,

Judicial independence: "[T]he agency doing the assessing,
usually the Judiciary, must have substantial independence
(or separation) from the actors whose activities are being
evaluated. Independence means that the Judiciary should
be free of the fear of sanction for the decisions they
reach."112

108

Id. at 158.

109 Id. at 160.
110

Id.

111 Id.
112 Id. The requirement of judicial independence raises troubling questions
for democratic theory. If the judiciary is completely independent, how can its
accountability be ensured? Additionally, if the judiciary makes as well as applies
the law in the process of adjudication, what is the democratic content of the laws
they make? Id. Some commentators avoid this debate by arguing that the
judiciary merely applies the laws that are made by the legislature. However,
critiques by critical legal studies and American realists have shown that judges do
make law. See generally KENNEDY, supra, note 95, at 26-38 (remarking on a judge's
ability to dissolve a law's ambiguity through the process of adjudication, thereby
creating law). Some commentators arrive at the conclusion that it is a good
compromise to let the judges play this role since the judiciary is "the least
dangerous branch" of the government. This is so because it has so little power to
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Whitford's definition of the rule of law is close to Duncan
Kennedy's preferred definition.1 3 Kennedy roots for a "procedural
or institutional definition of the rule of law rather than a definition
114
that builds in or entails a particular substantive legal regime."
Kennedy's definition is therefore "instrumental" and not one that
purports to have an absolute value.
Conceptualized as such, the rule of law is historically and
institutionally particular to a specific legal regime and political
system. Therefore, prescribing the rule of law as a panacea for
anything in another legal system, apart from its procedural aspects,
seems meaningless or illogical. 115 Moreover, as Kennedy shows,
the rule of law, as developed in the United States legal system, has
a serious downside. 116 This is not as a matter of its internal logic,
but rather a result of its particular evolution in American
jurisprudence. Kennedy argues that the rule of law in American
jurisprudence is the discourse that legal and political theorists use
to "deny (suppress, evade, mystify, distort, conceal)" two key
phenomena:
(a) the degree to which the settled rules... structure public
and private life so as to empower some groups at the
expense of others, and in general function to reproduce the
systems of hierarchy that characterize the society in
question;

(b) the degree to which the system of legal rules contains
gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities that get resolved by judges
pursuing conscious, half-conscious, or unconscious
ideological projects with respect to these issues of

raise armies and impose taxes. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (analyzing
the powers of the U.S. Supreme Court).
113 See KENNEDY, supra note 95, at 13-14 (detailing the requirements of his
notion of the rule of law).
114 Id. at 13.
115 See id. (noting that the rule of law is not "absolute," as it must rely on a
normative context that other societal institutions provide).
116 See id. at 14 (arguing that legal institutions legitimate inequalities among
societal groups and conceal extensive judicial discretion).
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hierarchy. 117
The above definition of the rule of law makes sense to me to the
extent that it does not predefine social goods. As I outlined above,
a definition of the rule of law that has substantive content imbued
in it also prescribes the philosophy of the good society."18 Hence, it
sneaks in (via legal institutions) substantive moral and political
decisions without political debate and consensus.
What is interesting about how IDAs have prescribed the rule of
law as a necessary institution in achieving economic growth, is that
IDAs at times imbue the rule of law with substantive content or
value, and at other times empty it of the same, leaving only its
procedural or formal aspects. The following quotes from World
Bank literature illustrate this point.
The World Bank's 1996 World Development Report states:
Where the rule of law is in force, laws are applied fairly,
transparently, and evenhandedly to all; individuals can
assert and defend their rights; and the state's powers are
defined and limited by law. People in countries with a
well-established rule of law rarely stop to wonder where it
comes from. But transition economies need to start over, to
replace arbitrary rule by powerful individuals or
institutions with a rule of law that inspires the public trust
and respect that will enable it to endure.11 9
Furthermore, the World Bank writes, "The rule of law requires
good laws, demand for those laws, and institutions to bring them to
life." 120 "Failure to pass good laws imposes costs that go beyond
the mistakes in individual laws to the integrity of the legal system
itself. Laws passed with major inconsistencies and uncertainties,
or with clear avenues for abuse, simply deepen public cynicism
and mistrust." 121 Finally, the World Bank concludes:
Id.
118 See notes 106-112 supra and accompanying text.
117

119 WORLD BANK, FROM PLAN TO MARKET, supra note 3, at 87. Here, the World
Bank espouses the formal conception of the rule of law.
120 The idea of "good" laws and institutions intimates the rule of law in its
substantive conception. Id. (emphasis added).
121 Id. Here, we return to a formal conception of the rule of law.
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Many transition economies are well along in the process of
drafting and enacting legislation in the fundamental areas
of property, contracts, company organization, bankruptcy,
and competition, as well as other, more specialized topics.
Inonsistencies and omissions remain, however, and many
laws are only now beginning to be implemented.
Governments are often hesitant to relinquish control,
citizens are slow to assert their new rights, judicial and
are
still severely
institutions
enforcement
other
underdeveloped, and a body of legal interpretation to help
guide practice in specific areas must be created, largely
from scratch.

Many transition economies have adopted new bankruptcy
laws....

Design is only half the issue, however; bankruptcy laws are
not yet effectively enforced in any transition economy.

In sum, although property rights are now recognized on paper
and to a growing extent in practice, they are still not free from
extensive arbitraryinterference."2'
It should be clear from the above quotations that there are two
conceptions of the rule of law in operation here. The parts that are
italicized in these quotes clearly express the idea that there are
123
some "good" laws that are in accord with "the rule of law."'
Examples of "good" laws include property laws, laws ensuring
122

Id. at 88, 92. Again, we are back to a substantive conception of the rule of

law.
123 See id. at 87 (comparing laws in transition and more established
economies); see also Peerenboom, supra note 103, at 484 (analyzing the varied roots
of modem law, such as natural, divine, and State law).
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freedom of contract, laws that ensure corporate autonomy, and
bankruptcy and competition laws.124 It is this notion that there is
some content in the law that is "good" that imbues the World
Bank's conception of the rule of law with a substantive content.
However, at the same time, both the passages quoted above are
written in language that casts the rule of law as a procedural
element that serves Lon Fuller's "eight general requirements" for
the rule of law.125 According to Lon Fuller, the "eight general
requirements" of legality that are inherent in the idea of law are:
nonclarity,
non-retroactivity,
promulgation,
generality,
contraction, possibility of compliance, consistency over time, and
126
congruence between official action and the declared rules.
The issue here is less that the content and substantive
viewpoint with which the World Bank (and the other IDAs) imbue
the institution of rule of law with is wrong -as in the fact that it
represents particular political choices. 127 Of course, the particular
substance the World Bank and other IDAs imbue in the institution
also suffers from the serious downsides analyzed by Duncan
128
Kennedy.
This kind of conflation of the two aspects of rule of law can be
discerned in various foreign-aided Rule of Law projects in
developing countries and transition economies. These views are
reflected in the writings of commentators and participants in these
Projects. Many of them start by explicitly dichotomizing the two
aspects of rule of law and insisting that the only one that is
appropriate for IDAs to prescribe to developing countries is the
"core" meaning that involves the formal meaning. For example,
Anders Fogelklou, giving a Swedish perspective to the rule of law,
defines it thus:
[R]ule of law will be defined as a legal order which follows
124 WORLD BANK, FROM PLAN TO MARKET,
125 FULLER,

supra note 3, at 88-92.

supra note 94, at 33-39.

Id.
Under a liberal conception of the state, citizens hold differing and
competing conceptions of what is good and bad in human life. However, "they
can still agree to a set of ground rules to abide by in pursuit of the ends that they
regard as worthy of their efforts [even if these ends are incompatible]. The
establishment and enforcement of such ground rules is the rule of law." ALTMAN,
supra note 101, at 60. It is imperative in this liberal conception of the state that the
ground rules (the "rule of law") be neutral between competing conceptions of the
good life.
128 KENNEDY, supra note 95, at 14.
126

127
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certain principles for the exercise of state power.

Two elements form the starting point for an analysis:
appropriate legislation following rule of law principles, and
compliance with existing legislation and principles by
officials, politicians and administrators. If one of these two
main points fails in regard to one or more legal areas, the
rule of law is defective in this field. 129
As I pointed out above, the key to the World Bank's definition
of the rule of law is the incorporation of the element of
"appropriate legislation." It turns out that what is meant by
appropriate legislation is specific content of substantive law that is
deregulatory in nature:
The idea that the law has to be comprehensive, covering basic
areas of the social system, is of special importance for states
remaking their legal system in view of their present
challenge of establishing democracy and a market
economy, but is of course valid for all states. But even the
main principles of the rule of law themselves have to have a
legislative foundation. This idea, of course, does not mean
that everything, [sic] must be legally regulated but that
major social areas such as business transactions,
environmental problems etc., have to be covered by legal
rules. In general, the preferredforms of legal regulationare those
which leave as much liberty and decision-making power to
individuals themselves to conduct their business activities within
the framework of legal rules.130 (emphasis added).
As is clear from the above quotation, although Fogelklou
agrees that only the core meaning of the rule of law, approximating
the instrumental definition I adopted, should be required for all
regimes, in enumerating the aspects of the "core," he lists the
129

Anders Fogelklou, Principlesof Rule of Law and Legal Development, in LEGAL

ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SWEDISH PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW

32,37 (Per Sevastik ed., 1997) (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 50.
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requirement that the law has to be "comprehensive." 131 By this he
means that laws must regulate economic activities in a way that
leaves the market as the prime allocator of resources in the
132
economy.
Similar sentiments have led some political scientists to criticize
the formal conception of rule of law as too limiting. For example,
Richard Flatham has criticized a rule of law conception that places
emphasis on "fidelity to the law" only, because such a conception
does not pay due attention to the essentially "political" issue of the
"proper scope and content of legal regulation." 133 Again, the
suggestion here is that the establishment of the rule of law is
"suspect" unless it is imbued with a given content that is insulated
from the reach of officialdom. 34
Similarly, other Western commentators on the rule of law start
by recognizing the two aspects of rule of law before they quickly
collapse them. The following examples suffice:
Jeffrey Sachs and Katharina Pistor state:
The essence of "rule of law" is the constraint by law of
governmental behavior and authority. There is no canon of
the definitive elements of rule of law. However, countries
Id.
Id. The main problem with this notion of the "market" allocating
resources without interference from the state is that the market is itself a creation
of the state, influenced by the state's previous decisions and interventions in the
economy. Therefore, the decision to let the "market" do the allocating is, in fact,
an argument for a particular allocation by the government. Besides, since the
government continues to provide other background rules and institutions, each of
which can be operationalized in many different directions, and each direction of
which affects the participants in the economy differently, the notion of the market
allocating resources is merely mythical. For an excellent analytical expos6 of the
mythical content of the argument that the "market" can actually allocate resources
in a way that is most economically efficient, and most politically free, see Duncan
Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998).
133 Richard Flatham, Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political
Institutionalization: The Case of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 297, 301-07 (Ian
Shapiro ed., 1994).
134 Peerenboom enumerates similar objections by commentators calling for a
"thick" conception of rule of law in China. He reports that these commentators
argue that "thin" (or formal) conceptions of the rule of law lack sufficient
normative content and may therefore give rise to morally reprehensible "evil"
empires like Nazi Germany. See Peerenboom, supra note 103, at 483 (arguing that
to remedy thin rule of law, scholars have suggested that the rule of law requires
"good" laws grounded in a normative foundation).
131

132
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that respect the rule of law usually share the following
features: they "divide the powers of government among
separate branches; entrench civil liberties (notably, due
process of law and equal protection of law) behind
constitutional walls; and provide for the orderly transfer of
political power through fair elections."... Rule of law is not
necessarily identical with "good" or "efficient" laws. However,
the two largely overlap. States committed to the rule of law
invest heavily in well-designed laws, which reduce transaction
costs, and train their legal personnel to enforce laws, contracts,
135
and property rights in a fair and predictablemanner.
As if to reiterate that the establishment of rule of law must
entail the writing of substantive content into laws, Sachs and
Pistor, in reviewing Russia's performance, argue that: "[ilt takes
time to reform the judicial system, to train and/or replace its
136
personnel, and to replace existing laws with new ones."
A similar pattern of reasoning can be discerned in Thomas
Owen's Autocracy and the Rule of Law. 137 He begins by adopting
Gaus's definition of the rule of law, which purveys the impression
of being decidedly formal:
A recent fourfold definition of the rule of law in American
legal theory likewise had nothing in common with the
Russian autocratic principle. First, laws must embody the
principles of "generality, publicity, and exclusion of
retroactive legislation, clarity, stability, exclusion of
legislation requiring the impossible, [and] congruence of
official action and declared rule." Second, laws must protect
the personalfreedom of citizens. Third, laws must govern the
actions of the executive power through a constitution and
an independent judiciary. Finally, citizens are expected to
obey the law even when it conflicts with their own moral
135 Jeffrey Sachs & Katharina Pistor, Introduction: Progress, Pitfalls, Scenarios,
and Lost Opportunities, in THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA 1, 1415 (Jeffery Sachs & Katharina Pistor eds., 1997) (second emphasis added).
136 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
137 Thomas C. Owen, Autocracy and the Rule of Law in Russian Economic
History, in THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA 23, supra note 135, at
26.
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beliefs. 138 (emphasis added).
Readers would be quick to pick out the first element in this
definition as mainly comprised of Lon Fuller's "eight principles of
legality."'139 However, what replaces Fuller's purposive coherence
and internal morality, which I argued earlier is pretext for
substantive filling of the laws in Fuller's definition of rule of law, is
the second element in this definition. The requirement that laws
must "protect" the personal freedom of citizens is value-laden. It
purveys the innocuous impression that it is general and
procedural, but in reality the definition of "personal freedom" is
given an interpretation that includes specifically defined rules
defining private property and freedom of contract. Owen, for
example, concludes his essay with the following revealing remark:
"The identification of corporate capitalism with foreign
cultural values remains a serious impediment to
acceptance, by Russians, of the economic implications of the
rule of law: free markets, private property, rational
procedures for contract enforcement, and a stable
40
currency."'1
Thomas Carothers, who has emerged as one of the foremost
experts on rule of law in developing countries and now heads the
rule of law project at the Carnegie Foundation, displays the same
41
tendency in his two highly influential publications:'
Rule of law rests on other important features: laws that are
publicly known, clear, and applied equally to everyone;
respect for political and civil liberties, especially due
138 Id. at 26; see also Gerald Gaus, Public Reason and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE
OF LAW 328, supra note 133, at 328-330 (discussing the "four ways of being ruled

by law" -formal requirements, individual justice, regulation of political authority,
and a moral obligation to obey the law -and their incorporation into a theory of
rule of law in liberal society).
139 FULLER, supra note 94, at 39.
140 Owen, supra note 137, at 37.
141 Thomas Carother's publications, infra, are cited with approval by the
World Bank and the USAID and in various World Bank publications. Jennifer
Widner refers to him as an influential "policymaker." JENNIFER WIDNER, BUILDING
THE RULE OF LAW 205 (1997). As indicated in note 38 supra, Carothers discusses the
"revival of [the] rule of law."
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process in criminal matters; and the subordination of
government power to legal authority. Aid providers draw
a close connection between advancing the rule of law and
promoting democracy.

An economic rationalefor rule-of-law assistance is often close by
the political one. Aid officials assert that the rule of law is
necessary for a full transition to a market economy-foreign
investors must believe that they can get justice in local courts,
contracts must be taken seriously, property laws must be
enforceable, and so on. Not only do economic and political
rationales dovetail, but many transitional societies confront
growing government corruption and ordinary crime, and the
United States and other donors now prescribe strengthening the
rule of law for those ills as well. In short, the rule of law appeals
as a remedy for every major political, economic and social
challengefacing transitionalcountries.142
Similarly, in his famed The Rule of Law Revival, Carothers stated:
The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the
laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply
equally to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political
and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human
rights over the last half-century. In particular, anyone accused
of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing and is
presumed innocent until proved guilty.
The central
institutions of the legal system, including the courts,
prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, competent, and
efficient.... Perhaps most important, the government is
embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials
accept the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the

142 CAROTHERS,

supra note 34, at 164 (emphasis added).
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government seeks to be law abiding.143
Political leaders and foreign affairs practitioners from
developed countries prescribing the rule of law as requirements for
foreign aid similarly have mixed conceptions of the rule of law.
For example, Frank E.Loy, the Under Secretary for Global Affairs
during the Clinton administration, is on record as having stated:
No anti-corruption strategy, no matter how welldesigned and well-intended, can succeed without a broader
commitment to two over-arching requirements: The first is
an independent judicial system based on a rule-of-law
regime. And that includes the concept of due process and
the principle that the rule of law applies equally to
everyone -from the poorest and least-privileged among us
to the highest echelons of government and society. The
second requirement is a government that is open,
accountable, and transparent. Here in the United States we
often refer to this idea as "government in the sunshine."

Some of you may be familiar with the International
Crime Control Strategy that President Clinton released last
year. The President spelled out a series of very specific
goals, one of which is to "foster international cooperation
and the rule of law."

I don't want anyone to think that our appointing a Rule
of Law Coordinator this year means we weren't already
working on rule of law issues. In fact, we've been quite
active on this front for decades all over the world.

143

Carothers, supra note 38, at 96 (emphasis added).
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In some Latin American nations where, historically, a lot of
crimes have simply gone unpunished, we have actively supported
governmental efforts to make their criminaljustice systems more
aggressive and more punitive. Needless to say, a laissez-faire
approach to crime and punishment has a terribly corrosive effect
on citizens' confidence in their leaders. So we're quite pleased
about the progress that governments in this hemisphere have
made.

Earlier this month in Guatemala,for example, three men were
sentenced to 28-year prison terms for an atrocious attack on a
group of American college students just a year earlier.14
This conception of rule of law by Loy is particularly interesting
because it includes notions of the severity of criminal law and
penalties as constituting the rule of law. It shows how much legal
content the rule of law can be clothed in yet maintain the
seemingly procedural desideratum of ensuring equality before the
law.
As a fitting way to conclude this section, I will point out what
145
Thomas Carothers has termed the "rule of law standard menu."
This list clearly states the aim of rewriting and modernizing
substantive laws as one of the five most important elements in the
rule of law projects by international development agencies.
According to Carothers, the rule of law "standard menu" consists
of:
Reforming institutions -including judicial reform,
legislative strengthening, retraining prosecutors,
police and prison reform, bolstering public
defenders and introducing alternative dispute
resolution;

Frank E. Loy, Under Secretary for Global Affairs, Remarks at the Vice
President's Conference on Corruption Organization of American States: The Rule
of Law and Its Importance (Feb. 25, 1999), http://www.state.gov/www/
policyjremarks/1999/990225loyruleoflaw.htm (emphasis added).
145 CAROTHERS, supra note 34, at 168.
144
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Political leaders and foreign affairs practitioners
from developed countries prescribing the rule of
law as requirements for foreign aid similarly have
mixed conceptions of the rule of law;

*

Rewriting laws-including modernizing criminal
laws, updating civil laws and introducing new
commercial and corporate laws;

" Upgrading
the
legal
profession - including
strengthening bar associations and improving legal
education; and

*

Increasing legal access and advocacy - including
stimulating public interest law reforms, supporting
advocacy NGOs, underwriting legal clinics, and
46
training journalists who cover legal matters.

Finally, as Carothers points out, the range of United States
institutions involved in the rule of law projects in developing
countries and transition economies is also revealing: United States
Agency for International Development ("USAID"), State
Department, Defense Department, Justice Department, Security
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), National Endowment for
47
Democracy and The Asia Foundation
I have used the excerpts and quotations in this section as
representative of the conceptions of rule of law in the law and
development field. The aim has been to show that in actual
operation, both the procedural and substantive aspects of the rule
of law are present in the understanding of the agencies that
support and implement Rule of Law projects. In the next section, I
will develop the argument that this conflation of procedural and
substantive aspects of the rule of law in these projects plays a vital
role in supporting and sustaining particular programmatic reforms
146

Id.

147 Id.
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in the developing countries and transition economies. In section
VIII, I will show the practical effects of this conflation of the
procedural and substantive notions of rule of law on politics and
participation.
6.

THE RULE OF LAW AS A "THICK CONCEPT"

I argue here that the World Bank and other IDAs do not deploy
the rule of law in accordance with any of the three conceptions
(procedural, substantive, and functional) outlined above. As
intimated in the last section, I argue rather that IDAs use the rule of
law in a fourth way that combines both the formal and the
substantive conceptions. The result of such a conflation of the two
conceptions of the rule of law is a usage that is akin to a "thick
concept": the formal or procedural conception gives it some
descriptive characteristics while the substantive conception gives it
some evaluative characteristics. In the process, particular ideas of
substantive policies (specific political and economic projects) are
dissolved into the idea of procedural rule of law. The resulting
melange is then presented as a functional conception of the rule of
law.
I borrow the notion of "thick concepts" from Philosophy. 148 By
"thick concept" I mean a concept which, by being both descriptive
and evaluative, hopes to create the conditions for action and urge
the action at the same time. Since I do not wish to be entangled in
the philosophical debates regarding the actual operation of thick
concepts as concepts that one can use to understand (or reflect on)
someone else's ethical perspective, I borrow the term functionally
to merely express the property of a concept to host a union of
factual and evaluative content simultaneously. 49 I use thick
For competing notions of "thick concepts" in philosophy, see generally
supra note 89 (describing several problems with academia's
understanding of modem moral philosophy) and PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND
VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1978) (understanding and
assessing the journey of different moral philosophers' beliefs); R.M. HARE, ESSAYS
ON THE MORAL CONCEPTS (1972) (examining different philosophers' positions in
the field of moral philosophy); HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE 16375 Games Conant ed. 1990) (gathering divergent ideas on the tradition of
American philosophy).
149 The concept of "thick concepts" is hotly debated in philosophy. While all
philosophers accept the definition of a "thick concept" as one that is
simultaneously both "descriptive" and "evaluative," they disagree over the nature
of the relationship between the two aspects of the concept. Their disagreement
over the relationship -whether the "descriptive" and the "evaluative" relate
"conceptually" or "conventionally" -has further implications in philosophy in
148

BERNARD WILLIAMS,
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concept therefore, to mean the property of a concept to straddle the
factual and the evaluative spheres. 150 As such, they blend fact with
value.1 51 By being a union of factual and evaluative content, they,
at the same time, guide our application of the concepts and the
perception of how things are in the world concerning them, and
other associated phenomena, and also provide us with a
motivation to act.1 52 Put differently, thick concepts both are guided
by how the world is, and guide peoples' actions. So they are both
53
world-guided and action-guiding.1
However, Bernard Williams and other philosophers use thick
concepts to try to understand the possibility of having objective
ethical judgments in a cross-cultural setting. 5 4 On my part,
however, I "misread" them by applying the concept in a
straightforward way to mean a concept that, by being both
descriptive and evaluative, hopes to create the conditions for action
and urge the action at the same time. 155 As such, they avoid the
determining one's positions on epistemological, metaphysical, and semantic
issues in the debate over realism.
I merely bracket these philosophical
disagreements and their implications for the ontological status of "thick
concepts," and merely borrow the concept to functionally convey the meaning of
a concept simultaneously having a "descriptive" and "evaluative" content. For an
excellent discussion of "thick concepts" applied to legal judgments and objectivity
in law, see Heidi Li Feldman, Legal Judgments, Thick Concepts, and Objectivity,
(1993) (unpublished Ph.D Dissertation (Philosophy), University of Michigan) (on
file at Harvard Law School Library).
150 Id. at 1.
151 Id.
152

Id.

supra note 89, at 169.
Bernard Williams, for example, proposes the use of "thick concepts" as a
tool that can enable one to suspend ethical judgment in relation to some of the
practices of societies that are, in a suitable sense, distant from one's own. This
suspension will include judgments made using some of our thick ethical concepts.
Id.
155 I use the term "misread" as used by Harold Bloom and first applied to
comparative law, to the best of my knowledge, by Diego Lopez. See Diego LopezMedina, Comparative Jurisprudence: Reception And Misreading Of Transnational
Legal Theory In Latin America (2000) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard
Law School) (copy on file with Harvard International Law Library). LopezMedina studies how "deviant," "heterodox," and "incomplete" readings of
jurisprudential texts that are considered magna opus in the West, render
fascinating, rewarding, enriching, relevant, and effectual jurisprudence of local
legal systems in Latin America. Harold Bloom uses the term to convey his theory
of revisionism. His main argument is that patterns of imagery in poems represent
both a response to and a defense against the influence of precursor poems. See
HAROLD BLOOM, MAP OF MISREADING (1975) (guiding readers through critical
reading of poetry). But his principal thought is probably captured in the
153 BERNARD WILLIAMS,
154
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necessity of political contest or debate regarding the nature of the
action by imbuing the action urged with a value. Since the value is
not subjected to debate or consensus but is merely assumed, a thick
concept as I use it plays a negative role in governance. It
predetermines politics: it brings a value to a situation, and then
urges actions based on the situation that is prejudged by the value.
The action is then justified in terms of the situation, while the
situation is justified in terms of both the value and the action.
My argument here is that the way the concept of rule of law is
deployed in the Rule of Law projects described above is that it
plays the role of a thick concept conceived in this way. As such, it
predetermines politics. To the extent that it enables any form of
participation, democracy, choice or freedom, all these political and
legal virtues can only be practiced or experienced within the realm
of the already decided and predetermined politics. These forms of
participation, democracy, choice, and freedom can therefore only
be comprehended as technical objectives of the established order
rather than real choices aimed at constructing and reconstructing
the social, political, and economic relations in the society by
consensus, according to changing needs of the society.
The practical effect of the conflation of the two notions of rule
of law into a thick concept in the Rule of Law projects, therefore, is
fourfold:
First, it makes the rule of law readily available to propose
15 6
specific programmatic legal and economic reforms.
Second, at the same time, the rule of law appears to assure the
democratic right to participate in decisionmaking and
determination of policies that govern given the polity. However,
the programmatic reforms proposed are already predetermined
and pre-decided by the substantive notion of the rule of law and
57
are therefore insulated from the democratic process.
following quote from an earlier work about "the always wandering meaning"of
all literary, representation, according to which "[m]eaning wanders, like human
tribulations, like error, from text to text, and within the text, from figure to
figure." See HAROLD BLOOM, KABBALAH AND CRITIcISM 82 (1975). I take the liberty
to do this "misreading" myself as, after all, as Jonathan Culler explains, "all
readings are misreadings. The best a reader can achieve is a strong misreading: a
reading that will in turn produce others. Most readings are weak misreadings,
which also attain neither understanding nor self-knowledge but blindly trope
upon the text while claiming not to trope."
JONATHAN CULLER, ON
DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITcIsM AFTER STRUCTRALISM 175 (1982).
156 See discussion infra Section 8.
157 See discussion infra Section 9.
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Third, this usage of rule of law as a thick concept has a
powerful emotive appeal by implicitly linking values with action.
By juxtaposing facts and values, the thick conception of rule of law
is an effective tactic for a successful mobilization of public opinion
158
by appeals to conscience that call on value.
Fourth, the more jurisprudential aspects of the rule of law (i.e.
the procedural conception of the rule of law) are then called in aid
to "lock-in" the reconfigured socioeconomic formations and
relations ushered in by the programmatic, substantive reforms (i.e.
the substantive conceptions of the rule of law).1 59 In this way, the
substantive aspects of the rule of law are justified on the grounds
that they are necessary for the procedural aspects of the rule of law
to have any effectiveness. On the other hand, the procedural
conception of the rule of law is justified on the opposite argument:
that the procedural conception of the rule of law is necessary for
the substantive reforms to have any effectiveness. Hence, the
"procedural" aspects of the rule of law in these projects can then be
understood as a supplementary political project to "lock-in" the
power gains in the reconfigured political, social, and economic
space after the redistribution occasioned by the adoption of the
substantive "good" laws dictated by the substantive aspects of the
rule of law. Thus, a combination of the core, formal, traditional,
jurisprudential conception of the rule of law is united with
radically new substantive meanings built into the concept. In this
way, the rule of law serves as an instrument for subverting the
democratic right of the polity rather than equipping it. Rather than
fill the mechanisms that give the citizenry power to determine the
158 Since the conception of the rule of law inherently connotes something
good ethically, the polity would accept both its procedural and substantive
properties. Conversely, any person who is skeptical of its desirability or
application is likely to be met with incredulity: "how can anyone be against the
rule of law?" It is in the same way various political projects of dubious moral
quality can be carried out by appropriating the moral languages of human rights.
Anyone who dares oppose them would then appear to be a "whacko" or a
"fascist:" How can anyone oppose human rights? These approaches to law and
organizing to influence peoples' way of viewing particular political choices as
ethical by ensconcing them in ethical values is a frequent technique used by social
movements. See Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach & Irving Tallman, Social Movements as
Moral Confrontations: With Special Reference to Civil Rights, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN VALUES: INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL 82, 82-94 (Milton Rokeach ed., 1979)
(arguing that social movements are successful because of their ability to link
values and actions).
159 See discussion infra Section 8 (addressing the effect of the rule of law on
participatory democracy).
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nature, shape, and direction of economic policies in a country, this
conflation of rule of law precludes such effective choice of
economic policies while enabling strategic participation in other
areas of politics.
Therefore, the version of rule of law that is being instituted in
most parts of the world through Rule of Law projects is one that
insulates a particular vision of moral foundation or philosophy of
the good of the society from the reach of political debate,
consensus or revision by the participants in the polity. It imbues
on the legal order a certain internal morality of the law that shapes
the content of the laws, and the responses and direction of the laws
and rules. 160 Because this view of internal morality is purposive, it
imbues in the law only a given content of the instantiation of legal,
social, economic, and political arrangements between citizens and
the government, and among citizens, as mediated by the law. At
the same time, however, it presents itself as "anti-design," an open,
interactive process resulting in an outcome of processes that
determines politics without fixed goals, design or plan. 161 So,
while it circumscribes the available choices for the citizenry, it
presents itself only as a guarantor of process that merely grants
freedom to citizens and other participants in the polity (such as
investors) to relate with one another. This position by IDAs is
similar to the position long ago taken by Lon Fuller:
[L]aw is not, like management, a matter of directing other
persons how to accomplish tasks set by a superior, but is
basically a matter of providing the citizenry with a sound
and stable framework for their interactions with one
another, the role of government being that of standing as a
162
guardian of the integrity of this system.
This conception of the rule of law is complex because it
incorporates a formalistic or procedural
simultaneously
component while at the same time linking it with a positive
prescription of a value of internal morality of the law. It is this
160 FULLER,

supra note 94, at 210.

This "anti-design" poise is necessary for the adherents of the view that the
state is a "civic association" rather than an "enterprise association." See supra note
8 and accompanying text (examining the distinction between the state as a "civil
association" and an "enterprise association").
162 FULLER, supra note 94, at 210.
161
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double aspect of it that coheres with the need to have "good
laws." 163 It is, hence, both evaluative as a formal criterion, and also
prescriptive of values that the purposive orientation of the law
must reflect in its internal morality. This, therefore, implies the
need for substantive content in certain laws. For Lon Fuller,
therefore, as for the IDAs, the internal morality actually forms the
"constitutive outside" that politically legitimates and delegitimates the "zone" of acceptable and unacceptable substantive
"good," "comprehensive," or "appropriate" laws.164
Hence, the rule of law that emerges from the main message of
neo-liberalism (that "imperfect markets can be made to work better
than imperfect governments" 65) ends up not being the institutional
mechanism through which the government cedes economic role to
the market. Rather, it becomes a totalitarian imposition of a
structure that ensures participation in already decided politics. It
starts with the innocuous claim that "all social relations be wholly
voluntary and private." 166 Markets will then foster "unanimity
without conformity, and reduce social strain by decreasing the
number of highly contested political decisions." 167 The result is,
however, that the law that emerges is "individualistic,
microeconomic, and focused towards private law." 168 Such a focus,
in turn, serves to define private property, freedom of contract, and
private corporate autonomy in absolute ways, the same way as
they were constructed within the common law context in the
United States during the Classical Legal period.169 This as opposed
to conceptions of property, freedom of contract, and private
corporate autonomy that are malleable to collective choices based
on ideas of community values, egalitarianism, altruism, social
justice, and equity. 170
163 See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text (noting the blurred line
between market initiatives and substantive law).
164 FULLER, supranote 94, at 210.
165 See Purdy, supra note 39, at 7 (noting the connection between various
"liberal ends").
166 Paul H. Brietzke, Designing the Legal Framework for Markets in Eastern
Europe, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW 35, 38 (1994).
167 Id.
168

Id.

See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 284 F. 613 (D.C. Cir. 1922), aff'd,
261 U.S. 525, (1923) (holding an act which provided fixed minimum wages for
female employees in private employment to be an unconstitutional interference
with the freedom to contract).
170 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 55 P.2d 1083 (Wash. Sup. Ct.
169
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THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND PARTICIPATORY POLITICS

However, it is in the extrapolated interaction between the rule
of law and democracy that the rule of law as conceived in the Rule
of Law projects achieves paradoxical and destabilizing results.
These results threaten the apparent coherence of the reforms. Most
liberals assert that for the successful establishment of rule of law,
which, in turn is a requirement for market-oriented reforms to be
successful, there is a necessity for a moral consensus. 171 However,
there is debate about whether a fully participatory democratic
system can establish such a moral consensus (which is, I think, Lon
Fuller's equivalent to "internal morality" of the law which drives
the purposive interpretation of the law).172 This has led some
liberal scholars like Stephen Holmes to suggest that the
establishment of such a moral consensus requires a state with
sufficient capacity and flexibility to push through difficult policy
choices, to outmaneuver political opponents, and to create the
173
institutional foundation for a new, stable order.
The suggestion here is to leave questions of distribution of
power incompletely defined to create flexibility that would give
the executives in transition economies "wiggle room" to
outmaneuver the inevitable opposition to economic reform. 74 This
1936), affd, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding the Washington Minimum Wages Act did
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as it was a valid
exercise of the state's police power to protect the health and safety of women).
171 See, e.g., Gerald Gaus, supra note 138, at 355 (arguing that if a community
is deeply divided on a wide range of issues, the practical resolution of moral
disputes through the rule of law will be precarious since whatever the umpire
decrees, some will declare that it is a violation of fundamental law). I am using
"liberal" here in its classical sense. I am referring to the adherents of "liberal
democracy" as a socio-political system. I am not using the term "liberal" in its
popular U.S. conception as the opposite of "conservatism." See, e.g., RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, 181-5 (1985) (proposing that liberalism's
meaning had changed during the 1960s and 1970s, but a conception of equality is
the static nerve of liberalism).
172 See, e.g. Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-abiding society:
Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into
Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 734-35 (2000)
(discussing the problems with using moral consensus as a basis for rule of law).
173 See Stephen Holmes, Back to the Drawing Board, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 21,
21-25 (1993) (making an argument for constitutional postponement in Eastern
Europe); Stephen Holmes, The Post-Communist Presidency, in 2-3 E. EUR. CONST.
REV. 36, 36-39 (1993) (discussing the powers and political styles of the East
European presidents) [hereinafter Holmes, Presidency].
174 See Holmes, Presidency, supra note 173 (discussing the powers and political
styles of the East European presidents)..
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opposition is expected to come from the legislature, organized
labor, or any other organized citizen group. 175 Holmes even
suggests that it is imperative that executives have sufficient
flexibility to re-negotiate the rules of the game in the midst of the
game so that they can re-adjust to the changing position if they are
to create sufficient capacity for the state. 176
The aforementioned argument about the rule of law becomes
more compelling if one makes a parallel analysis of another
institution typically prescribed by the World Bank and other IDAs,
namely democracy. Just like the institution of the rule of law, the
institution of democracy has two aspects. The first aspect "refers to
the idea of popular power and emancipation conceived as a selfreflexive form of politics... This notion highlights the substantial
content of democracy, inconceivable without morality and radical
in its ability to constantly redefine politics." 177
Like Professor Laakso, I call this first aspect of democracy the
substantial or emancipation notion of democracy1 78 The second
aspect of democracy "reduces the meaning of democracy to a
certain institutional design of decision-making, which, in turn, is
seemingly value-free and neutral concerning different political
programmes. When democracy is interpreted [this way], its salient
179
point is [not] emancipation but functionality and effectiveness."
Again like Professor Laakso, I call this the instrumental or
If one looks at these two
rational notion of democracy. 80
definitions, it should be easy to see that they closely parallel the
81
two aspects of the rule of law as defined by Duncan Kennedy.'
The "instrumental notion" mirrors what Duncan Kennedy referred
to as an aspect of the rule of law 8 2 called a "procedural or
175 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, supra note 52, at 144-156
(examining the challenges of initiating and sustaining reforms).
176 Holmes, Presidency, supra note 173, at 39. The World Bank has essentially
adopted this reasoning. See WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, supra note
52 and accompanying text (investigating how the role of the effective state must
adapt in the changing world).
Whose Democracy? Which Democratisation?, in THE
177 Liisa Laakso,
DEMOCRATISATION OF DISEMPOWERMENT: THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY IN THE THIRD

WORLD 210, 210 (Jochen Hippler ed., 1995).
178 Id.
179

Id.

180 Id.
181

KENNEDY,

accompanying text.
182 Id.

supra note

95; see also supra notes 113 and 114
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institutional" definition. 83
At some point, he also calls it
"instrumental." 184 The "substantial or emancipation notion" is the
one Duncan Kennedy would have derided as an "absolute valueoriented" definition were Laakso defining the institution of rule of
law.185

Given the operationalization of the conception of rule that we
have described above, it seems that the only form of democracy
that can emerge from the neo-liberal reforms is the instrumental
rather than the substantive conception of democracy. This is
because, as I pointed out above, the degree of choices that the
individuals in the polity are permitted to make are circumscribed
by the preferred conception of rule of law. This aspect is
illustrated by the way IDAs, for example the World Bank, assume
the merit of the policy proposals in adjustment, but require some
aspects of them to be put through parliamentary procedure to be
rubber-stamped by the representatives. For example, consider the
following quote: "[Tlhe leadership must be able to withstand
opposition to reform.... Leaders can offset resistance through a
combination of compensation and compulsion-for example, by
offering fired workers severance payments and by banning strikes
in strategic industries or otherwise reducing labor union power." 186
Indeed, the instrumental notion when it comes to democracy is
so strong that it has led Professor Ake to remark that "[The World
Bank is] far more comfortable with apoliticism than the political
pursuit of democracy . . . . They enforce political conditionality
reluctantly and only after reducing democracy to governance and
governance to the political correlates of structural adjustment,
1 87
particularly the rule of law, transparency and, accountability."
I should note here two inconsistencies regarding the World
Bank's attitudes towards the institutions of rule of law and
democracy. First, the World Bank chooses when to root for a
"substantial" (or "substantive") definition of an institution and
when to prescribe a merely "instrumental" (or "procedural") one.
Second, the choice of whether to assign a substantive or procedural
conception to an institution turns on the ability to mobilize
193
184

Id.
Id.

185 Id.

186 WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 190-91 (1995).
187 CLAUDE AKE,

(1994).

THE

DEMOCRATISATION OF DISEMPOWERMENT IN AFRICA
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particular legal categories in a given way to purvey its favored
meaning. That is to say that the World Bank is more confident in
using legal categories in purveying its desired meaning and
meeting its favored goals. Hence, it is possible and desirable to
imbue the institution of rule of law with substantive (absolute
value) content because this can drive the ideological interpretation
in a given way safely, i.e., without too much risk of opening up the
institution to rival interpretation that would politicize the
institution. This eschews the possibility that the meaning of the
institution could be opened up for political contestation with the
possibility that the World Bank's favored interpretation may be
modified, subverted or entirely changed.
However, when it comes to the institution of democracy, it
turns out the World Bank prefers the "instrumental" notion to the
"emancipation" notion of the institution. As Ake points out, even
then, it still carefully reduces the "instrumental" down to more
particular categories that can be comprehended legally, and in a
specific way. 188 Again, the World Bank's confidence is only
inspired here, when the institution is stripped to its constituent
"legal" categories. After this point, the plot is familiar. Basically
each of the legal categories can then be imbued with particular
substantive (absolute value) content in the same way as happens in
the case of the institution of the rule of law.
We can speculate why a "substantive" definition of the
institution of democracy would be threatening to the World Bank.
Conversely, we can also speculate why a "procedural" definition
of the institution of rule of law would be destabilizing to the World
Bank. In both cases, ideological stakes seem supreme. Further, it
would be possible to contest the particular meanings given to the
concept by the Bank using local practice. In other words, it would
be possible to operationalize both institutions, and yet subvert the
particular choices that the Bank prefers to see institutionalized in
the reform process.
As I have already noted, to the World Bank, a substantive
definition of the rule of law is essential for conveying the meaning
189
of the rule of law that denies ideological content in adjudication.
A procedural definition of democracy, on the other hand,
functions, paradoxically, to deny ideological content in legislation.
188 Id.
189 See generally KENNEDY, supra note 95 (discussing how the diffusion of lawmaking power reduces the power of ideologically organized majority).
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This might appear alarming and ridiculous even to the most
In liberal thinking, ideology in
committed liberal thinker.
adjudication is denied in toto. 190 The play and competition of
ideology is restricted and expected to play a role only in the realm
of politics or rule making.' 91 Though liberal thinkers differ in how
sharply they conceive the distinction between rulemaking and rule
application, they are united in accepting that in general ideology
should play a role in politics but not in adjudication. The bottom
line is that " [i ]n the liberal tradition... politics is interpreted above
all as a conflict and compromise between different interests.... [It
is] about [people's] interests providing the content of politics....
Competing interests are not only qualifications given to
individuals; rather, they define individual political existence in
192
liberal democracy."
So, it is in the realm of politics, of rule making, of democracy,
that ideology is acknowledged to play a role. This is because, in
the realm of rule making or politics, ideology is cognitively created
into interests. 193 These interests are articulated as "dynamic
significations." 194 Or as Duncan Kennedy puts it:
In this [liberal] normative view, the law-making process
requires value judgments, which are inescapably subjective,
and therefore political. Because law making is political, it
should be done by elected officials... operating under a
195
norm of accountability to their constituents.
The bottom line is that competing interests can be presented
and discussed in the realm of politics and rulemaking. In a conflict
situation, compromise or consensus becomes possible. However,
under liberal political theory, once this conflict is resolved and
190 See id. at 196 (arguing that judges should in some sense be nonideological).
191This is because, in liberal democracies, legislatures make the law.
Legislatures are the policymaking bodies. In making rules and laws, legislatures
choose from among alternative courses of action. In making choices, legislatures
may legitimately hear from interest groups or independent groups in order to
prudently exercise rulemaking authority. See, e.g., WILLIAM KEEFE, CONGRESS AND
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1988) (examining how legislative decisions are made).
192 Laakso, supra note 177, at 211.
193

Id.

194

The term, which I like, is Laakso's. Id. at 213.
KENNEDY, supra note 95, at 27.

195
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consensus reached as reflected in the law, in the task of rule
application or adjudication, there is no room for ideology. In other
words, liberal democracy is founded on the idea that rival
ideologies only compete and reach a resolution in the more
transparent realm of politics. Contrastingly, the rule of law as an
institution ensures that the process of adjudication is purged of
"ideology." 196 Of course, the bright line between legislation and
adjudication has been the subject of intense debate within and
without the liberal tradition. The result is that the distinction has
been largely blurred. Further, the little integrity that is left to the
distinction has fallen prey to the trenchant criticism that:
[I]deology influences adjudication, by structuring legal
discourse and through strategic choice in interpretation...
[further that] the denial of the presence of ideology in
adjudication leads to political results different from those
197
that would occur in a situation of transparency.
In other words, according to Kennedy, the illusion created by
the appearance of determinacy in adjudication contributes to,
influences, or partly causes the patterns of social life rather than
just mystifying them.198 People would be less likely to accept the
patterns if they understood that the appearance of determinacy is
just a mask for determination by human beings that make political
choices. 199 However, this is not even the mischief I am accusing the
World Bank of propagating in this specific context.
The argument, rather, is that in prescribing reform packages,
the World Bank does flout even this liberal "structuring" of the
society. The liberal "structuring" I am referring to here is one that
dichotomizes adjudication and legislation and accepts that
ideology can and should play an important role in the latter but
not in the former. However, in prescribing the reform packages,
the World Bank flips the role of ideology in the political
196 As Duncan Kennedy has shown, there is a difference between denying the
"ideological element in judging" and denying that "judges make decisions that
are important to ideological intelligentsias." Most liberals would readily agree
with both these formulations since they preserve the ultimate denial that
adjudication has no ideological content. Id. at 23.
197 Id. at 19.
theory of judicial objectivity's impact on
198 See id. (describing the
adjudication).
199 See id. (emphasizing the role of political ideology in judicial judgments).
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organization of the society. There are two subtle, almost similar
ways in which the Bank does this. First, by prescribing an
"absolute value" notion of the rule of law, the World Bank
prescribes an ideology as "truth." Second, the Bank empties the
institution of "democracy" of its substantive content and thereby
precludes the ideological debates that ideally should take place in
the realm of politics.
8.

THE RULE OF LAW AS A TOOL TO POLICE PROGRAMMATIC
PROPOSALS: THREE ILLUSTRATIONS

Given the actual operation of the rule of law projects I have
described above, it is possible to conclude that the rule of law does
not, in the context of neo-liberal reforms, act as a liberating tool for
the majority of the citizenry in the Third World. Rather, it merely
becomes a vehicle for manufacturing consent through strategic but
circumscribed "decided politics." 200 Therefore, the Rule of Law
(and good governance) discourses of IDAs become an alibi
ideology deployed to contain and police the radicalism and
indeterminacy that participatory democracy (which is the opposite
of the coin of the rule of law) might unravel. Thus, the rule of law
ensures the unavailability of systemic changes by the demos while
While Sahay uses "decided politics"
200 Amrohini Sahay, supra note 13.
positively to resist the post-modernist conservative debilitating position which
dispenses with the politics of "totality" as epistemologically unviable, since such a
position ultimately dispenses social phenomena into an indeterminate series of
differences without any necessary underlying basis which could explain these
differences as part of a global common structure of exploitation, and which thus
fixes politics as local. In the absence of such an objective explanatory principle
(which can grasp the cause of social phenomena) what are elided are the
determinate connections between disparate phenomena -connections which the
materialist critique establishes-in order to isolate these off and prevent them
from being related to the system of exploitation. It is only on these terms that
cultural studies is able to advance politics not as a transformative collective praxis
to abolish exploitation, but, rather, as a series of local, cosmetic changes whose
ultimate effect is to (re)secure the exploitative practices of the inside. On the
contrary, Sahay argues that there is an "underlying principle" which explains the
disparate historical series. There is a historical basis for materialist critique as a
practice of knowledge of the social totality. Contrary to the bankrupt "paninsidism" of constitutive outsidists, in short, there is a non-constitutive "outside"
which delimits the exploitative practices of the inside and constitutes an
"unsurpassable objectivity" as the "foundation of revolutionary praxis and of
critique as part of such a praxis." I appropriate the term "decided politics" from
Sahay, however, to convey the negative meaning of politics where the significant
decisions are made elsewhere by a "constitutive core" in the society who then
seek to fabricate consent for these decisions on the rest of the society via the law,
or instrumental democracy.
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ensuring a systematic, patterned change by the telos of
The language of rule of law acknowledges
development.
multiculturalism, human rights, and other conceptions that give
the impression of participation, but it actually functions to exclude
some voices or alternatives to the teleological path of development.
At the very best, it functions to relegate to the margins these
alternatives.
To this extent, the rule of law no longer evinces the procedural
propriety that it expresses itself to be guaranteeing. Instead, it
provides substantive concrete proposals about the direction in
which the foundational political decisions should be oriented. The
decisions of what the concrete proposals contain are made by
people other than the general population through debate, and
political consensus in the political arena. Therefore, to the extent
that politics have already been "decided" in an arena other than
politics, there is no genuine democratic participation.
"Participation" and "democracy" then become mere signaling
rituals that are staged so as to elicit the "consent" of the majority to
the already pre-determined programmatic proposals.
I will briefly demonstrate this systematic staging of
"participation" that is already predetermined to manufacture
consent of the polity or citizens -but in a way that the there is
really no choice at all presented to the citizens. Rather, what
emerges is a deep desire to require the citizens to alter their
behavior in the pre-determined way. Democracy and participatory
politics are then subverted. All that the people have is the
appearance of participation -but this is limited to either the less
significant issues (i.e., fundamental questions on the allocation of
resources are insulated from political debates) or to deciding from
circumscribed choices in an either/or fashion.
8.1. The Politics and Nature of Participationin StructuralAdjustment
Programs
The impact of Structural Adjustment Programs ("SAPs") on the
poor has been the focus of an interesting debate between
20 1
international financial institutions ("IFIs") and social scientists.
201 Structural Adjustment Programs ("SAPs") are policy-based lending
programs designed by the international financial institutions (notably the World
Bank and the IMF) to compel recipient countries to reform their economies in a
pre-agreed manner. They are based on the starting point that the economic crisis
in these countries was precipitated by policy failures. In particular, SAPs aim to
address the criticism that the state in developing countries plays too big a role in
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IFIs have contended that the reforms supported under SAPs are
essential both to reverse unsustainable economic conditions that
202
hurt poor people, and to enhance poverty-reducing growth.
Many social scientists have responded that adjustment imposes
onerous burdens, including excessive fiscal contraction, on
developing countries; forcing on them an agenda of liberalization,
deregulation, and privatization that leads to cutbacks in essential
They
services, higher inequality, and deepening poverty. 203
contend that adjustment has failed either to produce the desired
204
reforms or to increase growth.
By the mid-1990s, studies had shown the extent to which
poverty, inequality and human suffering had increased in
countries implementing SAPs imposed by IFIs. 205 In the face of the
the economy. As an incentive for these governments to reform their economies by
liberalizing, the international financial institutions grant loans guaranteed not by
collaterals but by "conditionalities" that the governments will carry out particular
economic and political reforms. Nancy C. Alexander reports that by the late
1980s, the percentage of loans involving SAPs was "42 percent in Latin America;
33 percent in sub-Saharan Africa; 30 percent in Europe, the Middle East, and
North Africa; and 10 percent in Asia." See Nancy C. Alexander, Transcendingthe
Vicious Cycle of Debt and Adjustment, in WORLD DEBT AND THE HUMAN CONDITION:
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 171, 173 (Ved P. Nanda

et al. eds., 1993) (illustrating the correlation between adjustment and bank lending
in certain geographical areas). See g~enerally Jason Morgan-Foster, The Relationship
of IMF StructuralAdjustment Programs to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The
Argentine Case Revisited, 24 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 577 (2003) (noting the possibility that
SAPs conflict with economic, social, and cultural rights).
202 See

generally WORLD

BANK,

SUB-SAHARAN

AFRICA:

FROM

CRISIS

TO

SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (1989) (discussing the challenges involved in achieving
sustainable economic conditions).
203 See, e.g., THANDIKA MKANDAWIRE & CHARLES C. SOLUDO, OUR CONTINENT,

OUR FUTURE (1999) (explaining, from the perspective of African scholars, some of
the reasons for Africa's poor economic performance).
204 See id. (describing the potential negative impact of adjustment).
205 For example, in 1994, the World Bank's own study concluded that of the
29 countries under SAPs in Africa, only 6 were "successful" -a failure rate of 80%.
Even then, looking at the six countries given a passing score of "successful" in
1994, today, the Bank may be forced to reconsider its evidence. The six
"successfully adjusting" countries were named as: Gambia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria,
Ghana, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania. Of these six, probably only Ghana would still
be in this category today. See World Bank, ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA, 58 (1994)
(demonstrating that Ghana enjoyed one of the greatest improvements in
macroeconomic policies among sub-Saharan African countries); see also William
Easterly, The Effect of IMF and World Bank Programson Poverty (2000), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/staffp/2000/00-00/e.pdf (arguing that
there is no direct effect of structural adjustment on growth). Many people within
the IFIs have acknowledged the adverse impact of SAPs in developing countries.
See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) (discussing the
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growing chasm between the two positions, the World Bank
responded, not by re-orienting its lending criterion in a different
direction, but instead by emphasizing the correctness of its
prioritization. However, they agreed to set up a separate process
to help those who are adversely affected by adjustment. 2 6 In other
words, the World Bank was willing to let the participation of
others, including those affected by the policies, only to reduce the
impact of the adjustment process-but not willing to debate the
desirability of the adjustment process itself. While the World Bank
justified its position based on the argument that promoting
economic growth is the only way to achieve significant poverty
reduction, it only allowed refutation of its premises as argument
for reforming the way to deal with adjustment-but not as
questioning the merits of the adjustment process itself. 20 7 Indeed,
the emerging debate came to be characterized as one between
those who favor "adjustment with growth" (like the World Bank
and the IMF), and those who favor "adjustment with a human
face." 208 The implication was that adjustment was a foregone
detrimental effect that globalization can have on developing countries). Easterly
was an economist and Stiglitz was the Chief Economist at the World Bank.
206 For example, the World Bank acknowledged some of the criticisms of
SAPs.
It joined civil societies in setting up the Structural Adjustment
Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) and participated in its design and
implementation. SAPRI selected ten countries in five continents as a basis for its
research and raised independent funding to carry out the research. The report by
SAPRI was first released in 2002. The report was damning in its findings. It
concluded that, far from reducing poverty, SAPs resulted in increased poverty
and economic inequality, as well as numerous economic crises in developing
countries. The Report recommended that SAPs do not work and that the Bank
needed to rethink its development model. Rather than engage SAPRI on these
questions, the Bank tweaked the recommendations and, instead, started
advocating for "participation" by "stakeholders" in drawing poverty reduction
initiatives in developing countries. See Structural Adjustment Participatory
Review International Network, SAPRIN Releases Findings of Joint Participatory
Assessment of Structural Adjustment Conducted with World Bank, available at
http://www.saprin.org/fora-report-overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2005)
(describing the impact of policies and the Bank's lack of response).
207 See David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Growth Is Good for the Poor, (World Bank,
Development Research Group, March 2000), available at http://www.worldbank.
org/research/growth/pdfiles/growthgoodforpoor.pdf (noting the correlation
between an increase in the income of a nation's poor and the growth of a nation's
economy at large); see also World Bank, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001:
ATTACKING POVERTY (2001) (discussing poverty, opportunity, and growth).
208 See, e.g., Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Economic Decline and Human Welfare in
the First Half of the 1980s, in ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE (Giovanni Andrea
Cornia, et al. eds., 1988) (discussing economic adjustment and development in
Africa); see also World Bank, AFRICA'S ADJUSTMENT AND GROWTH IN THE 1980s
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conclusion: the only matter for political debate and consensus was
how to mitigate its adverse effects.
As a result of this debate within the World Bank, the Bank
began to ask that loan documents include a summary analysis of
"the short-term impacts of the adjustment program on the urban
209
and rural poor, and the measures proposed to alleviate them."
The Bank also began to stress the importance of maintaining social
spending for poor people during adjustment, and of having
specific measures in place to ensure that poor people benefited
when growth resumed. 210
Hence, when the issue of participation in decisionmaking is
raised, it is with respect to generating consensus as to the sharing
of the burdens of adjustment. The issue is not framed in a
language that suggests that there can be an alternative to the
particular adjustment proposed. The only issue opened for social
participation is how to share the burdens of that adjustment. 21 ' For
example, at a high-level meeting convened by the International
Labor Organization ("ILO") designed to bring together proponents
of "adjustment with growth" (the IMF and World Bank), and
proponents of "adjustment with a human face" (UNICEF, ILO,
IFAD, and UNCTAD). 212 They adopted a set of conclusions about
213
including the less-heard voices in the adjustment debate.
The metaphor of poverty alleviation has thus become the
language through which democracy is a participatory process for a
polity to decide its own economic system. 214 Rather than design
(1989) (analyzing Africa's economic growth).
209 World Bank, Guidelines for Preparation of President's Report for Adjustment
Lending Operations, Annex D1 of Operational Manual Statement 2.01, Guidelines
for Preparing and Processing Adjustment Loans and Credits (1987).
210 See CARL JAYARAJAH, ET AL., SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT: WORLD
BANK EXPERIENCE, 1980-93 at 104 (1996) (emphasizing the correlation between

growth and poverty reduction). ,
211 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ON EMPLOYMENT AND
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, Geneva, 23-25 Nov. 1987, ILO Doc. GB.239/5/1, at 2731.

Id.
Id.
214 For example, in 1999, the World Bank and the IMF agreed that Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) written by developing countries, in
consultation with their civil society, will become the basis of future lending by the
212
213

IFIs under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country ("HIPC") initiative. See
generally Int'l Monetary Fund, POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPERS:
A
FACTSHEET, (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/
facts/prsp.htm (itemizing the major purpose and principles of PRSPs).
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ways in which countries can empower their populations to make
decisions about their economic well being, the discourse reduces
democracy to participation in sharing the burdens. The idea of the
"social" is reinvented to deal with the harmful effect of the
adjustment. 215 Thus, the idea of the social emerges again to
"manage" the masses rather than empower them to control their
own destinies. This is because the discourse constructs the
adjustment as necessary, and reduces the role of democracy to
participation of how to share the burdens. However, the welfare
aspects of the "adjustment" introduce a second layer of
adjustment - social programs designed precisely "to alleviate some
of the negative consequences of the aid itself." 216 Thus, instead of
democracy and genuine participation becoming the effective
determinants of social and economic goals, the discourse has two
elements that both enable participation and disable its full
effectiveness. On the one hand, it has the "egalitarian socialism"
that fosters the idea of social programs to alleviate the harmful
costs of adjustment. 217 On the other hand, it has the distributional
conservatism aspects that define the adjustment itself and
constructs its policy imperatives as inevitable. Hence, while the
World Bank continues to support the idea of adjustment coupled
with growth, it has also initiated compensatory programs such as
the social dimensions of adjustment program.218 The purpose of
this program is to: "[C]ompensat[e] individuals displaced by
reforms and temporarily meeting the basic needs of [groups
215 By "social," I am referring to the political or legal consciousness that
emphasizes the importance of "interdependence" in social and economic life.
This is as opposed to an "individualist" consciousness that insists only on
individual autonomy. The former consciousness (the "social") would conceive of
the need for governmental regulation in more ways than the latter. The
consciousness of the "social" was at the core of the developing countries'
The opposite
heterodox economic policies during the 1960s and 1970s.
"individualist" consciousness (with its concomitant belief in market solutions) is
at the core of the neo-liberal development model epitomized by SAPs. The
interesting point here is that after justifying SAPs using the "individualist"
mantra, the World Bank sought to lull their adverse effects by appealing to the
"social"-not to reform the reform agenda but to mitigate its impacts. On the
"social" and the "individualist" consciousness and their impact on legal and
economic reform programs, see generally, Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment
of Logicall Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the
ContemporaryMode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2004).
216 KATARINA TOMAVESKI, DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTs 201 (1989).
217 See id. (explaining the growing focus on eliminating the poverty associated
with the adjustment programs).
218 Id. at 35.
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excluded from growth], safety nets [address] humanitarian
concerns [and temper] the immediate political costs to
219
governments implementing radical... reforms."
In this regard, the idea of social programs could be to shield the
poor from the full impact of the cost of adjustment. 220 This
objective of shielding the poor from the full impacts of economic
policies without reforming the economic policies which are
responsible for their poverty parallels the invention of the "social"
in nineteenth-century England. 221 Both the "poor laws" in
nineteenth-century England and the "social dimensions of
adjustment program" in twenty-first-century developing countries
aim at "managing" the poor in a way that they do not disrupt the
system of allocating resources in the society.222 The poor can
participate only in sharing the burdens of the system; they cannot
choose an alternative system.
8.2. The Regulation of Bank Interest Rates in Kenya
By the end of the 1990s, Kenya had initiated rapid liberalization
in its financial sector as one of the conditions for concessionary
lending by the IFIs.223 One result of the rapid liberalization of
interest rates coupled with rising public debt (especially domestic
debt) was that savings deposit rates decreased dramatically while
borrowing interest rates increased exponentially. 224 By June of
2000, the nominal average savings deposit rate was 4.8%.225 The
nominal lending rate was 21.7%, resulting in a whopping interest
supra note 210.
Id at 3.
221 See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 280 (1971) (arguing that
the "Poor Laws" in England, while framed as charities for the poor, were, in fact,
a systematic aid-in-wages aimed at depressing the wages of the working poor
under the subsistence level; for example, that the administration of the "Poor
Laws" was coupled with a special anti-trade union law and elaborate subsidies
for the industrialists); see also, Arturo Escobar, Planning, in THE DEVELOPMENT
DICTIONARY, 132, 132 (Wolfgang Sachs ed., 1992) (describing how societal
planning was a means by which the upper classes subjugated the poor in
nineteenth-century Europe and how planning retards Third World development).
222 See POLANYI, supra note 221, at 280; see also Escobar, supra note 237, at 133.
223 Mbui Wagacha, Interest Rates Under a Treasury Bill Regime: Macroeconomic
and Financial Implications for Kenya 1 (Inst. of Pol'y Analysis & Research,
Discussion Paper No. 029/2001, Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Wagacha, Interest Rates].
224 Id.
225 Mbui Wagacha, A Primer on the Interest Rate Question in Kenya, 5 IPAR
POL'Y Q., Nov. 2000, at 1, available at http://www.ipar.or.ke/pg5.zip [hereinafter
Wagacha, Primer].
219 JAYARAJAH, ET AL.,
220
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This widening interest rate spread
rate spread of 16.9%.226
depressed both savings and investments by creating disincentives
for economic actors to save while increasing the price of accessing
investments through bank borrowing. 227 This, in turn, triggered
second-order problems in the economy. As Dr. Wagacha of the
Kenya Institute of Policy Analysis and Research noted:
The ensuing fiscal pressure and lack of banking
competition have spawned a high interest rate spread that
depresses both saving and investment, while economic
activity in both the productive and financial sector is
reduced. Coupled with the burden of servicing past debts,
enterprises have seen their debt/equity ratios rise and their
net worth fall. In the banking sector, mounting nonperforming assets have similarly slashed banks' net worth,
raising problems of insolvency for enterprises on the
margin. 2 8
One of the major causes of the crisis was the government's
policy of borrowing through high-interest Treasury Bills. 229 The
trend of borrowing from local banks using Treasury Bills with high
interest rates gave these banks an incentive to lend to the
government while distorting their perception of the risks
associated with lending to individuals and firms. 230 This trend was
exacerbated by inefficiency and lack of competition in the banking
sector. 231 As a result, interest rates soared, making credit for
232
productive investments unaffordable to local firms.
Understanding the issue as one of market failure, Parliament
responded by enacting the Central Bank of Kenya (Amendment)
Act of 2000 (popularly known as the Donde Act). 233 The Donde
226 Id.

227 Id. For the sake of comparison, the interest rate spread in neighboring
Tanzania and Uganda at the time was about 10%. The spread was about 6% in
South Africa. The average spread in developed economies was 1.5%. Id.
228 Wagacha, Interest Rates, supra note 223, at 1.
229 Wagacha, Primer,supra note 225, at 4.
230 Id.
231 Id.

232 Id. at 5.
233 The Central Bank of Kenya (Amendment) Act of 2000, No. 4 (2001), KENYA

GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 62, § 2. The Act was proposed and sponsored by Hon.
Joe Donde, the former Member of Parliament for the Gem Constituency. Id.
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Act proposed to deal with the market distortions in four specific
ways:
*

First, the Act set a maximum lending rate for
commercial banks and other financial institutions at
four percentage points above the ninety-one day
Treasury Bill rate published by the Central Bank of
Kenya; 234

*

Second, the Act introduced the in duplum rule, which
provides that the interest on a loan stops running when
the unpaid interest equals the outstanding capital or the
235
principal sum borrowed;

"

Third, the Act set a minimum interest rate that
commercial banks and other financial institutions may
pay on deposits held in interest bearing accounts at
seventy percent of the ninety-one day Treasury Bill
rate;236 and

*

Fourth, the Act prohibited banks and financial
institutions from levying charges other than statutory
237
charges and interests on loans.

This legislative response was heavily criticized. Politically,
there were concerns that returning to interest rate regulation was a
step in the wrong direction as it would only lead to more state
intervention in the market.2 38 Pragmatically, it was argued that the
law would affect small savers by excluding them from formal
banking since banks would respond to the law by raising the
minimum amount of deposits required to earn interests on a
savings account. 239 Economically, it was feared that the Donde Act
would limit the flexibility of banks in dealing with economic
Id.
Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 See Wagacha, Interest Rates, supra note 223, at 6 (discussing a specific
concern that if the Kenyan government continues to dominate the market by
borrowing, interest rates will become a function of changes in government debt).
239 Id. at 7.
234

235
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shocks.240 All these are valid and justified concerns. However, in a
liberal democracy, these concerns should be addressed to and
resolved by the legislative branch as they involve issues of resource
allocation and political ideology. 241 Supporters of the Donde Act in
Parliament responded to these concerns by arguing that they were
responding to empirical evidence of a pervasive market failure in
the interest rates market which required governmental
intervention. They argued that the benefits of making credit
accessible to the average economic actor in the country outweighed
the costs of such intervention. 242 Opponents of the bill, notably the
Kenya Bankers' Association ("KBA"), made the opposite
arguments. 243 All in all, proponents of the law garnered sufficient
support to enact the law. The ideological question of how much
regulation was sufficient in the interest rate market was
determined where such ideological issues should be decided - in
244
the realm of politics.
Needless to say, the KBA and the IFIs were unhappy with this
return to regulation of interest rates in Kenya. 245 KBA responded
with a suit to have the law declared invalid. In Ruturi & Kenya
Bankers' Association v. Minister for Finance, the KBA argued, inter
alia, that the new regulation "goes contrary to newly embraced
economic policies of liberalization under which things must be
governed by market forces, free of control by statute." 246 Rejecting
these arguments, Justices Kuloba and Mbaluto of the High Court of
Kenya sitting as a constitutional court ruled:

240 Id.

241 See supra notes 195-199 and accompanying text.
242 See, e.g., Ochieng Oloo, Why Interest Rates Should be Regulated, MARKET
INTELLIGENCE, 2002, available at http://www.mi.co.ke/business-and-finance/
hot topics/why-interest-rates.asp (arguing that the provisions of the Donde Bill
will not only succeed in making credit accessible to more Kenyans but also make
the banking sector more efficient).
243 See, e.g., id. (noting that the Kenya Bankers' Association contends that the
Donde Act has hurt banks because the law is being applied retroactively).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 195-96.
245 Oloo, supra note 242; see also Njeri Rugene & Onesmus Kilonzo, Kenya MPs
Rebel Against WAB and IMF, DAILY NATION, Apr. 28, 2002, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wbank/2002/0428mps.htm
(describing the tension between MPs and represetatives of the IMF and World
Bank over the Act).
246 (2001) L.L.R. 1706 (HCK) (Kenya), available athttp://www.lawafrica.com/
specials/donderuling.htm.
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There was also an argument [for the plaintiffs] that [the
Donde Act] goes contrary to newly embraced economic
policies of liberalization under which things must be
governed by market forces, free of controls by statute. It
was said that to introduce controls by law will put us in
disharmony with other liberal economies with which we
deal; and that the consequence will be that our economy
will sink, if not collapse.... Attractive arguments as they
are, we do not consider it appropriate for the court to
comment on, or decide, them, because these are questions
If the Government wishes to introduce
of policy.
controls... and a section of the Kenyan people or some
interested group does not like such control measures being
introduced, then it is a matter which goes beyond the
realms of courts. 247
Here, the High Court of Kenya correctly refused to adjudicate
conflicting ideological questions whether the Donde Act is as
market-oriented as the KBA wanted. As the U.S. Supreme Court
had failed to find in 1908 in Lochner v. New York, 248 the High Court
of Kenya recognized that it was not within the court's province to
adjudicate on the "constitutionality of an economic theory." 249 Like
Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Lochner, the two justices
from the High Court of Kenya recognized that a "constitution is
not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of
laissez-faire."250 Instead, the two justices avoided "Lochner's error"
and deferred to the legislature regarding the wisdom (or lack
thereof) of regulating interest rates. 251 The High Court of Kenya
252
refused to review the "reasonability" of a legislative enactment.
247

Id.

248

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

Ruturi & Kenya Bankers' Association v. Minister for Finance, (2001) L.L.R.
1706 (HCK) (Kenya), available at http://www.lawafrica.com/specials/
donderuling.htm.
249

250
251

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Leg~acy, 82 TEx L. REV.

1, 2-3 (2003). ("Avoiding Lochner's mistake is the 'central obsession' of modem
constitutional law. Supreme Court Justices are at pains to deny that their opinions
declaring laws unconstitutional are Lochnerian, while dissenting Justices use
Lochner as an epithet to criticize their colleagues.").
252 Ruturi & Kenya Bankers' Association v. Minister for Finance, (2001) L.L.R.
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The court stated:
A statute reversing a given economic policy, or introducing
a new commercial or economic regime may have political
repercussions for the political party in power, but it does
not of itself thereby become an unconstitutional statute.
Such a statute may influence the voting at a national
election time, but it remains a valid statute within the
constitution of Kenya. Some people want a State controlled
economy; others do not want any form of control, and
desire a free enterprise. That is for economic policy makers.
The court cannot go into this arena. No constitutional
253
provision is violated.
This is a position that would find favor in U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence. After the U.S. Supreme Court briefly toyed with the
idea of substantive due process in which judges routinely struck
down New Deal legislation, the U.S. Supreme Court backed away
However, despite the widespread
from "Lochnerism." 254
acceptance of anti-Lochnerian constitutional principles in modern
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, the High Court of Kenya's
decision in the Ruturi case was not greeted with a chorus of
approval. Instead, it was assailed as a reversal of market-friendly
economic policies.
The World Bank threatened to withhold
concessionary lending unless the Donde Act was declared
unconstitutional or otherwise reversed by parliament. 25 5 As a
result of this pressure on the government, the government
sponsored and a chastened parliament passed a new amendment
in 2004 repealing the sections of the 2000 amendment that
256
introduced regulation.
1706 (HCK) (Kenya),
donderuling.htm.
253

available at

http://www.lawafrica.com/specials/

Id.

However, there is controversy over what exactly the Supreme Court
backed away from-or differently put, what exactly Lochner's error was. See, e.g.,
Bernstein, supra note 251, at 3-8 (noting the evolving view of Lochner's error).
255 See, e.g., Rugene & Kilonzo, supra note 245; Muna Wahome, IMF Ups
Pressure Against Donde Act, DAILY NATION, Apr. 22, 2002. The World Bank
Representative to Kenya expressed concern at the High Court decision, and hoped
that the Kenya parliament would reverse the law.
256 Central Bank of Kenya (Amendment) Act of 2004, No. 8 (2004) KENYA
GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT. At §5 this Act amends the Central Bank Act by entirely
254
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The argument here is not that the position of the IFIs on the
regulation or deregulation of interest rates in Kenya was right or
wrong as a policy matter. As was the debate during the Lochner
era, the issue was one of the right to regulate. Who has the
authority to decide on questions of allocation of power, resources,
and authority in a society? Under liberal theory, such decisions are
decided within the realm of politics where ideologies play out.
The problem with the IFIs' position on the regulation of interest
rates in Kenya is that they aimed to stunt these ideological debates
in the political sphere by dismissing the possibility that the Kenyan
parliament could rationally resolve to respond to market
conditions in the banking sector by regulation. At the same time,
by hoping that the High Court of Kenya would strike down the
Donde Act, there was an implicit aspiration that the judiciary
would act ideologically, as the Lochner court had done. In other
words, the IFIs would have ideology play no part in the politics of
legislation, but would not mind it playing a role in adjudication so
long as it aids market-oriented policies. Therefore the rule of law
should not be fully enabled when it unleashes anti-market
discourses and legislation.
8.3. Privatizationin Poland
A third, brief illustration of the rule of law in use is in its
discourse to police neo-liberal economic reforms, as seen in
Poland's experience with privatization. After a slow start with
privatization of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"), Poland has
arguably become one of the more successful market economies in
Eastern Europe. 2 7 One of the toughest hurdles the reform-minded
Polish government faced in the early 1990s in its efforts to privatize
SOEs was a strong organized labor movement. 258
Poland's
deleting § 39. Section 39 of this Act was the new section inserted by the Central
Bank of Kenya (Amendment) Act of 2000 that introduced regulation of interest
rates. See supra notes 234-37.
257 See, e.g., Gerald A. McDermott, The Politics of Institutional Learning and
Creation: Bank Crises and Supervision in East Central Europe, (William Davidson
Institute,
Working
Paper
No.
726,
2004),
available
at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/Workingpapers/wdi/w
p726.pdf) (arguing that the Polish approach to bank sector reforms led to "one of
the most cost-effective bad debt resolutions, a stable banking sector with
increased lending, and a strong supervisory authority" among the three leading
postcommunist democracies).
258 Id. at 11-12; see also Witold Gadmoski, Poland: A Confused Public, A Divided
Parliament, ECON.
REFORM
TODAY,
Summer
1993,
available
at
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transition from a centrally planned economy to a market
democracy allowed the labor movement to exercise its
considerable political influence to sponsor a privatization law
259
requiring consent of SOE workers before they were privatized.
The 1990 law established employee committees which had the
power to veto ownership changes in SOEs.260 Witold Gadomski, a
Polish member of Parliament, explained the effect of the 1990 law
on privatization as follows:
The Privatization Law of 1990 requires the consent of
employee committees before a state-owned enterprise can
be converted to private ownership. Furthermore, the
committees are entitled to decide which type of
privatization they want the firm to undergo, and in what
legal business form it will exist. When privatization began,
employee committees demanded that certain conditions be
satisfied prior to privatizing their enterprises. For example,
in September 1992, the Italian auto maker Fiat made plans
to take over the Polish auto company FSM. The workers,
however, went on a lengthy strike, demanding salaries
equal to those received by Fiat's employees in Italy. These
protests postponed the privatization of FSM by a few
months, with the delay resulting from the privileges

granted by the privatization bill.261
In 1992, with the encouragement and technical assistance of the
World Bank, the government of Poland developed a
and
and Bank Restructuring
Enterprise
comprehensive
EBRP's objective was to
Privatization Program ("EBRP").262
restructure and privatize Poland's state-owned banks and financial
institutions.263 However, EBRP faced a veritable hurdle. As
(discussing the
http://www.cipe.org/publications/fs/ert/e08/7poland.htm
unique and dominant role that workers' councils play in Polish politics, and the
manner in which their strength was underestimated by the Polish government in
regard to privatization efforts in the early 1990s).
259 The Law on Privatization of the State-Owned Enterprises Act of July 12,
1990 (hereinafter the "1990 Law on Privatization"). An unofficial translation of
the law is available at 29 I.L.M. 1226 (1990).
260 McDermott, supra note 257, at 128; Gadmoski, supra note 258.
261 Gadmoski, supra note 258.
262 ALICE AMSDEN ET AL., THE MARKET MEETS iTS MATCH 114 (1998).
263 See McDermott, supra note 257, at 8-9 (discussing Poland's plan to
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pointed out above, the 1990 Privatization Law stipulated that the
employees of SOEs had to approve privatization through
264
employees' councils.
To circumvent this legislative stipulation, the EBRP devised an
"innovative" procedure. 265 The government of Poland describes
this "innovation" as follows:
To facilitate privatization as an outcome of enterprise
restructuring, the EBRP gives creditors (state-owned banks
and others) holding at least 30% of a public enterprise's
debt the right to convert their claims into shares. In the
case of SOEs, this conversion will automatically trigger a
transformation into a joint-stock company. This provision
constitutes nothing less than a breakthrough in the Polish
Government's privatization policy since, for the first time, it
makes privatization of an enterprise possible without the
266
legal consent of its workers.
Thus, to circumvent the requirement that employee councils
consent to privatization of SOEs, the government of Poland and the
World Bank devised this "innovative" creditor-led restructuring
whereby an agreement reached among certain creditors of an SOE
trumped the legislatively-required consent of the workers. 267 The
purposely tie "bank restructuring and recapitalization to firm restructuring to
solve the stock and flow problems together through legislational enactments such
as the EBRP").
264 Article 5 of the 1990 Law on Privatization provides:
The Minister of Ownership Transformation may transform a state-owned
enterprise into a corporation:
(1) upon the joint request of the executive director of the stateowned enterprise and the employees council filed after receiving an
opinion from the general assembly of employees (delegates) and an
opinion of the founding body of the enterprise; or
(2) request of the founding body filed with the consent of the
director of the enterprise and employees council and after receiving
an opinion from the general assembly of employees (delegates).
29 I.L.M. 1226, 1231.
265 AMSDEN ET AL., supra note 262, at 114.
266 Id. (quoting GOVERNMENT OF POLAND, SUMMARY OF ENTERPRISE AND
FINANCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT PROJECT (1993)).
267 WORLD BANK, FROM PLAN TO MARKET,
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logic here is ironic. It suggests that it is perfectly legitimate for the
government to use undemocratic means if only it aims at
establishing the "market." The Market Meets Its Match captures this
"[t]he irony seemingly went unnoticed that in
remarkably:
countries committed to eradicating their communist past,
268
undemocratic means were now used to achieve capitalist ends."
The irony of the government using "innovative" means to
subvert democratic governance is remarkable for two reasons.
First, democratic governance is clearly stipulated as one of the
causes and consequences of efficient market societies that produce
IDAs, therefore, articulate democratic
high growth rates. 269
governance as one of the objectives in market-oriented legal
reforms. 270 Indeed, in the 1990s, the link between democratic
governance and economic performance has been made explicit.
Second, such an "innovation" really means that the government
must devise and use laws for its substantive purposes. As I
already discussed above, this goes against the very grain of the
dominant liberal "civil association" view of the state that formally
denies any substantive function for the state. 271 This is as opposed
to the "enterprise association" view of the state that concedes the
necessity (or at least inevitability) of the state having a substantive
purpose in the economic functioning of the society. 272 What
emerges here is another flip in justification and reasoning in World
Bank practice. The World Bank's view of Poland's privatization
seems like a clear admission that the state should, at least at times
play the role of "legislator of substance." 273 It then appears that the
difference between the two views of the state (the state as "civic
association" or "enterprise association") is not disagreement over
the substantive propriety of the state's role in undertaking some
functions -"legislating substance." Rather, the disagreement is
supra note 262, at 114.
269 See, e.g., Int'l Monetary Fund, Exhange Arrangements and Surveillance: The
Role of the Fund in Governance Issues-Guidance Note, IMF Document EBS/97/125,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/
2,
1997,
July
index.asp?decision=EBS/97/125 (discussing the "strong consensus among
Directors on the importance of good governance for economic efficiency and
growth"); WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992).
270 International Monetary Fund, supra note 269.
271 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
268 AMSDEN ET AL.,

272
273

Id.
Id.
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really about the specific function for which the state is legislating and not the procedural or substantive impropriety of the action
itself.
Both views do, at different times, propose that the
government legislates for its own substantive functions. And both
views do, at different times, deny that the state can or should do
that.
9.

THE LINK BETWEEN THE "THICK CONCEPTION" OF RULE OF LAW,
DEMOCRACY, AND THE "WASHINGTON CONSENSUS"

One does not have to accept Duncan Kennedy's critique of rule
of law and adjudication to accept the critiques I have made about
how IDAs structure their reform packages. 274 Even if one accepted
that it is okay for the institution of rule of law to have "absolute
value" content, one does not necessarily accept that the content
with which the rule of law should be imbued is the same one in all
countries. In other words, IDAs would have to persuade that the
"absolute value" content they attach to the institution of the rule of
law is the "right" one for the particular society for which they are
prescribing reform. This would, in part, require that IDAs open up
the realm of politics for ideological debate and presentation of
conflicting interests.
If this should happen, two things will become clear. First, IDAs
would have to replace the merely "procedural" prescription of
democracy with a "substantial" conception. Second, IDAs would
lose, in the process, their ability to shape the discourse by use of
legal categories. If democracy can no longer be defined in terms of
its structural correlates such as "rule of law" or "accountability,"
then a whole range of choices become available. Countries would
be free to debate and choose the different aspects of reform. And
the different competing groups and citizens of the countries would
be at will to pick and choose the best way to structure their
economies. However, this would run afoul of the economic
5
conditionality of the IFIs. 27
274
275

See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
On its website, the IMF defines conditionality as follows:

Economic policies that members intend to follow as a condition for the
use of IMF resources. These are often expressed as performance criteria
(for example, monetary and budgetary targets) or benchmarks, and are
intended to ensure that the use of IMF credit is temporary and consistent
with the adjustment program designed to correct a member's external
payments imbalance.
Int'l Monetary Fund, Glossary of Selected Financial Terns, http://www.imf.org/
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Quite bluntly, a conditionality is a purchase of policy change
by the IFIs. 276 The consideration for the purchase is "external
financing, whether debt rescheduling or relief, multilateral credits,
bilateral loans, or grants." 277 To drive this point home sufficiently,
I need to quote in extenso from Barbara Stallings:
One [of the international factors accounting for the policy
changes] was greater use of leverage. While the IMF
increased its role in coordinating debt service policies and
promoting stabilization in the 1980s .... [T]he World Bank
was brought into the center of activity in Third World
Baker's plan emphasized structural
economic policy.
adjustment, and the World Bank became the lead
organization for such activities through increased
concentration of SALs [Structural Adjustment Loans] and
SECALs [Sectoral Adjustment Loans]. The quid pro quo for
these large loans was economywide or sectoral adjustment
programs. 278
And what does leverage exactly mean? "These range from
relatively simple demand management policies for an IMF standby
through extensive structural reforms for a World Bank structural
279
adjustment loan."
If we consider this definition and historical explanation of the
genesis of the economic reforms that the World Bank prescribes, it
is clear why a "substantial" notion of democracy would destabilize
the World Bank's preferred reform path. Such a notion would
entail the possibility of choosing ideological as well as the structural
aspects of the reforms. This would then clash head on with the
ideological underpinnings of the structural reforms themselves. As
Barbara Stallings writes:
external/np/exr/glossary/showTerm.asp?term-id=19 (last visited on Oct. 22,
2005).
276 See Miles Kahler, External Influence, Conditionality, and the Politics of
Adjustment, in THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 89, 89 (Stephan Haggard &
Robert R. Kaufman eds., 1992) (exploring conditionalities as tools to influence
economic policy choice).
277 Id.
Debt,
278 Barbara Stallings, International Influence on Economic Policy:
Stabilization,and Structural Reform, in THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT, supra
note 276, at 41, 83.
279 Id. at 55.
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The loans were the embodiment of the new ideological
consensus that had been building for some time among
economists and governments in the industrial countries,
together with the international finance institutions. That
consensus stressed the value of liberalization and
privatization; the loans were a mechanism for bringing
280
them about.
The consensus Barbara Stallings is referring to here is now
popularly known as the "Washington consensus." 281 The inventor
of the term, John Williamson, argued that the set of policy reforms
which most of official Washington thought would be good for
economic reform in developing countries could be summarized in
ten propositions:
*

Fiscal discipline

*

A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward
fields offering both high economic returns and the
potential to improve income distribution, such as
and
primary health care, primary education,
infrastructure

*

Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax
base)

*

Interest rate liberalization

*

A competitive exchange rate

*

Trade liberalization

*

Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment

*

Privatization

Id. at 83.
See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN
AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 5, 7 (John Williamson ed.,
1990) (discussing what would be regarded in Washington as a desirable set of
economic policy reforms).
280
281
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Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit)

"

Secure property rights. 282

At the World Bank, this ideological consensus coincided with
another development that few people point to in the literature.
Devesh Kapur, however, captures it succinctly:
Autonomy has been the desire of every World Bank
President, and, for the most part, the degree of freedom that
the management has sought has been freedom from control
by the United States, both from the executive branch
personified by the U.S. Treasury, and, in particular, from
micromanagement by the U.S Congress. . . . But
diminished autonomy, albeit resisted, was the trend from
1981.283

I will end by making four points about this
of linking it with a "thick concept" conception
All of the four points indicate that the nature of
reforms in which the rule of law is expected

consensus by way
of the rule of law.
"market-oriented"
to be one of the

282 John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington
Consensus?, in 15 THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 251, 252-3 (2000).
Arguably, the World Bank has moved from this "fundamentalist" prescription as
evidenced by several publications in the post-1999 period, including several
written by Joseph Stiglitz, who was Senior Vice-President and Chief Economist at
the World Bank. However, despite views of critics like Stiglitz, the World Bank
continues to operate as though these critiques do not apply. The view seems to
be, as Williamson says, that such views that criticize the market solution can only
be entertained at the next level: after the government has ostensibly established
the market "from above." See , e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Thanks For Nothing, THE
ATLANTrC MONTHLY, Oct. 2001 (offering a case study to illustrate how the conduct
of international economic organizations can steer globalization and arguing that
the two troubling aspects of the IMF's characteristic behavior include secrecy and
governance); Joseph Stiglitz, Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition,
Keynote Address at the World Bank Annual Bank Conference on Development
Economics (Apr. 28-30, 1999) (arguing that the failures of reforms by certain
countries in transition are due to a misunderstanding of the foundations of a
market economy and of the basics of an institutional reform process); Joseph
Stiglitz, More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington
Consensus, in WIDER ANNUAL LECTURES 2, Jan. 1998, available at
(discussing
the
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/stig.htm
emergence of what the author calls the "Post-Washington Consensus").

283

DEVESH KAPUR ET AL., THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY: VOLUME

1, HISTORY 5 (1997).
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procedural institutions, is a pre-determined form of politics. The
concepts of rule of law and democracy are then required only to
superintend the imposition of the "decided politics" in the exact
form pre-determined elsewhere, by the international development
agencies. 2 4 Since, the "universalizing" of these very particular
political choices is really "the natural and largely unconscious
outgrowth of lives lived in particular social positions within a
competitive social system," I will, in this section, refer to these
285
choices as "ideological."
First, we should not lose sight of the fact that this "consensus"
in international development circles:
coincided neatly with the rising tide of opposition to "big
government" in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The convergence reinforced technical reassessment with
ideological commitment, at least in U.S. official circles.
Neoorthodox [Neo-liberal] assumptions wholly dominated
the reactions of the Bretton Woods institutions and of the
United States, Germany, and Japan. Linked to balance of
payments support through the new emphasis on policybased lending and backed by formal or informal crossconditionality among creditors and donors, neoorthodox
prescriptions were urged on governments in all regions and
284 See supra Section 6.
285 1 use "ideological" here in a value-free sense and not as the false
consciousness associated with Marxian conceptions of ideology. Thus, I adopt
Althusser's definition of ideology, which refuses to see ideology simply as the
product of a conspiratorial power group. Rather, for Althusser, ideology is
omnipresent; it inheres in every representation of reality and every social practice,
and all of these qualities inevitably confirm or naturalize a particular construction
of reality. See Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in

CRITICAL THEORY SINCE

1965 at 239, 239 (Hazard Adams & Leroy Searle eds., 1986)

(discussing the concept of ideology and analyzing ideological state apparatuses).
The definition that best captures the value-free sense I want to convey is Leslie
Paul Theile's: "Ideology is the natural and largely unconscious outgrowth of lives
lived in particular social positions within a competitive social system." Leslie
Thiele, THINKING POLITICS: PERSPECTIVES IN ANCIENT, MODERN, AND POSTMODERN
POLITICAL THEORY 220-21 (1997). This means that, based on a group's social
position, that group makes judgments about the relative place or worth of other
individuals and groups. These judgments then construct belief and value systems
used to advocate for and/or establish particular power structures corresponding
with these views. At the same time, group members propound beliefs that justify
both the judgments and the particular power structures established or proposed
to be established. If the group dominates, it creates practices that reinforce and
perpetuate the original judgment and power arrangements.
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in varied situations. 286
Given this coincidence, it is rather disingenuous to maintain
the argument that the World Bank policies are not "ideological" in
the sense of favoring and legitimating a particular form of societal
organization that rewards different economic actors.
This brings us to my second point. While, as I have pointed out
above, the real debate is not whether the market can "handle
everything," the World Bank and its protagonists on the one hand,
and its critics on the other, have elected to clash over a more sterile
debate. The debate on whether the World Bank tends to be
ideological is cast in the terms of whether or not the World Bank
adheres to the dogmatic belief that "markets can handle
everything." 287 This debate, at best, replays the unending debate
that asks whether market failure is preferable to government
failure. 288 It is in response to this shadow debate that John
Williamson forcefully states in favor of his invention, the
"Washington consensus":
Specifically, there is a real danger that many of the
economic reforms favored by international development
macroeconomic discipline, trade
institutions -notably
openness, and market-friendly microeconomic policieswill be discredited in the eyes of many observers, simply
because these institutions are inevitably implicated in views
that command a consensus in Washington and the term
"Washington Consensus" has come to be used to describe
an extreme and dogmatic commitment to the belief that
28 9
markets can handle everything.
However, the ideology that the World Bank purveys is not a
dogmatic faith that the "market can handle everything." 290 Indeed,
286 Joan M. Nelson, Introduction: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in
Developing Nations, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLICY CHOICE: THE POLITICS OF
ADJUSTMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 3, 11 (Joan M. Nelson ed., 1990).
287 Williamson, supra note 282, at 252.
288 See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
289 Williamson, supra note 282, at 252.
290 This caricatured debate is most likely a response to radical criticism of the
"market ideology" by the likes of critics including Robert Kuttner. See ROBERT

KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 3, 10 (1996)

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 26:3

if this were the ideology, it would be easier to debunk the World
Bank's ideology! However, the ideology is in the fact that while
the World Bank does believe that the market cannot handle
everything, it does decide, politically, what the market can and
should handle. Moreover, the World Bank also does decide what
the market is. In other words, the defense like that of Williamson
above leaves the most interesting questions unanswered.
The World Bank has been able to shape the development
discourse by delimiting and redefining the state and the market,
private and public. 291 It then uses this posited distinction as the
axis for determining what interventions are allowable, which are
economically efficient, and which are not. It is in drawing these
distinctions that the World Bank acts ideologically -and not in its
belief or lack of a belief that the markets can handle everything.
This explains the convergence between good governance and
economic efficiency on the one hand and democracy and human
rights on the other. 292 A further illustration can be made by
exposing the fact that the World Bank has not actually weakened
the government in its policy proposals, but strengthened it.293
For now, let me state the third point: the ten propositions that
Williamson himself puts up as the core "Washington consensus"
can themselves be ideological, notwithstanding the fact that
everybody-left or right, socialist or capitalist, reformer or
conservative -might agree that they comprise "core" reform
principles. 294 This is so for three reasons. First, the different
aspects of the package can be understood and interpreted in
markedly different ways. Just as we have argued above respecting
the institution of rule of law, each of these policy formulations can
be shown to be capable of widely differing interpretations. The
different interpretations are not right or wrong-they are just
(arguing that "good society requires a mixed economy .... using such principles
as regulated competition and freer trade").
291 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
292 See generally James Gathii, supra note 12, at 972 (noting that the "good
governance" discourse which undergirds Rule of Law projects is based on "the
promise and hope that markets under the good governance regime are an
antidote to the restrictions of state involvement in the economy that characterized
modernizing nationalism").
293 See generally Nicholas Hildyard, supra note 76 (arguing that the 1997
World Development Report of the World Bank "represents less a change of
direction than a repackaging and updating of neo-liberalism in the face of a
popular backlash against the policies promoted by the Bank").
294 Williamson, supra note 82, at 252.
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different. 295 As such, there is indeterminacy as to the interpretation
to be given to the different aspects of the package. 296 Hence,
whenever the World Bank or its protagonists claim that they have
identified the "core" elements of economic orthodoxy and then
proceed to explain the meaning of the concepts, what they are
doing in truth is assigning a preferred meaning to the concepts.
When they claim that the meanings are "universal" (the word
economists prefer is "convergence") or "scientific," it is because
that particular meaning is driven by a particular motive. However,
due to this motive, the indeterminacy of the concept and meaning
is denied. The "core" aspects can therefore be understood to be
ideological in the sense that they are susceptible to interpretive
manipulation. The definitions that the World Bank and its
protagonists assign to them appear "natural," "scientific," or
"universal" because they involve previously built-in definitions
about the issues that they deal with. By claiming that the
meanings are universal rather than particular choices (that may
well be justified on the facts and according to the lived realities of
those who advocate them), the World Bank would have provoked
the admonition by Karl Mannheim:
What is needed, therefore, is a continual readiness to
recognize that every point of view is particular to a certain
definite situation, and to find out through analysis of what
this particularity consists. A clear and explicit avowal of
the implicit metaphysical presuppositions which underlie
and make possible empirical knowledge will do more for
the clarification and advancement of research than a verbal
denial of the existence of these presuppositions
295 As I have shown elsewhere, even a category that seems as "technical" as
"land registration" can be capable of widely varying interpretations. See Joel
Ngugi, Re-examining the Role of Private Property in Market Democracies: Problematic

Ideological Issues Raised by Land Registration, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 467 (2004)

(analyzing land registration in Kenya to challenge some of the "rigid assumptions
of the resurgent neo-liberal orthodoxy").
296 Conceived this way, this core can simply be seen as formal categories.
Like all formal categories, these concepts do not have any natural meaning. They
have to be given meaning through an interpretive process. See MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 12-13 (1987) ("[E]very post-Realist law student
ought to know that when the town council declares that there shall be no vehicles
in the park, it becomes no easier to tell whether it meant to bar wheelchairs, bikes,
or a statue of a general in his jeep if we simply think harder about what the word
vehicle means").
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accompanied by their surreptitious admission through the
297
back door.
Three hinges hold up the back door through which the World
Bank and its protagonists have surreptitiously admitted the
specific interpretations that are construed as scientific or natural.
The first hinge is made of the legal institutions that the World Bank
uses. The Bank attributes to these legal institutions the quality of
objectivity, which, as I have shown using the concept of rule of
law, is often illusory. 298 The second hinge is "economistic." By this
I mean using formal methods of portraying economic data and
content with models and formulae, but without acknowledging the
models' limitations or correctly acknowledging the exceptions.
This hinge almost always turns on the question of allocative
efficiency. The meaning adheres because it can rationally be
the
The third hinge is empirical:
proved mathematically.
argument that empirically it can be shown that particular
meanings are correct. The ease with which it is possible for the
World Bank and its proponents to use any of these three
arguments to justify the meaning of one of the core aspects makes
it the second way in which the ten core aspects can be ideological.
My point here is that it is possible to oscillate among the three
hinges that the World Bank uses, to fluidly shift the justification for
a prescribed reform from one to another. As a result, this
oscillation gives the impression of a coherent whole that seems
solid and unimpeachable, simply because it can alternate between
the three available justifications. Hence, if one made a critique
based on the usage of legal institutions, then the World Bank
would style its response in terms of allocative efficiency. If one
criticized the World Bank on allocative efficiency, then it would
turn to empiricism. The empiricism justification is particularly
hard to critique. This is because, every time one critiques the
essentialism or reifications implicit in the models that are selfreproducing, one receives the likely response that the model
reduces the complexities for the sake of making useful abstractions
that are necessary for constructing models which can then be
tested empirically. Hence, if one proved in one specific case that
297 KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 80 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils
trans., 1936).
298 See supra Sections 6 and 7 (considering the lack of objectivity in World
Bank norms).
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the model constructed and used does not fit and match the specific
case under analysis, then one would encounter the response that
that specific reality does not repudiate the model. So, the fact that
the empiricism justification promotes the use of models tends to
reify without recourse. This is because one cannot use the
semantic mode, the critique of an incorporated ideology, to
question the empirical mode. And even if one marshals empirical
evidence to question it, then the argument shifts to the viability of
the model in general and not just specific instances in which it can
be disproved. Yet, the empirical mode, in making its claims and
between both the legal
justifications, freely oscillates
institutionalism mode and the allocative efficiency mode as bases
for its assumptions.
One example amply illustrates this practice of oscillating as a
significant tool-in-trade for the World Bank. This is how the case
of the East Asian miracle was handled at the Bank level in terms of
explication and exegesis. 299 I discuss this here briefly.
The East Asia miracle economies were enabled by:
governments' activist policies to quicken the pace of
industrialization and export an increasing proportion of
Outward-oriented development, in
industrial output.
conjunction with exchange rate policy, was a means of
achieving viable external balances and generating the
demand needed to accelerate GDP growth, force producers
to absorb technology, and strive after competitiveness. In
their efforts to industrialize, East Asian governments made
selective use of tariff protection and export incentives,
ranging from moral suasion to subsidies and mild financial
repression, so as to provide industry with financing at
300
lower cost.
Contrary to neo-liberalism's tenets, East Asia developed by
299 The "East Asian miracle" refers to the spectacular growth of the
economies of East Asian countries between the mid-60s and mid-90s. During this
period, the economies in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand grew at variable
rates between 4 and 8%. See, ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC
THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 34-51

(1990) (discussing economic growth in East Asia).
300 Shahid Yusuf, The East Asian Miracle at the Millennium, in RETHINKING THE
EAST ASIAN MIRACLE 1, 7 (Joseph E. Stigiltz & Shahid Yusuf eds., 2001).
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"getting the prices wrong" and subsidizing industry for lengthy
periods in an attempt to create viable exporters. 3 1 This was
facilitated by a strategy that created a bureaucracy that was able to
conceive and implement the designs of a strong state. 302 These
bureaucrats were well paid; insulated to a significant degree from
political pressures and empowered to take development initiatives
aimed at maximizing the growth of output and employment. 303 As
such, these states achieved remarkable economic success, despite
the fact that their governments had substantial discretion, property
and contract rights were often not specified clearly, and court
30 4
enforcement of such rights was relatively infrequent.
However, when the World Bank sought to document the
lessons of the East Asian miracle, the bank failed to face up to the
inadequacy of the "laissez-faire market economy is always optimal"
paradigm. 305 Instead, contrary evidence on the strong states of East
Asia was contained and diffused. Robert Wade has written that
"[i]n November 1991 the top management of the Bank and some
key Western executive directors opposed publication of a study...
301 See Alice H. Amsden, Diffusion of Development: The Late-Industrializing
Model and Greater East Asia, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 282, 284 (1990) (discussing the use
of subsidies to get prices wrong in order to stimulate investment and trade); ALICE
AMSDEN, ASIA'S NExT GIANT:

SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989)

(arguing the reasons behind South Korean growth and industrialization).
302 This refers to a more centralized, developmental state as was supported
by the conception of the market in the pre-1980 period. This conception of the
"strong state" is opposed to the concept of the "minimalist state" championed by
the World Bank. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
304 See Ohnesorge, supra note 35, at 91 (discussing the rule of law as a set of
ideals for the administration of justice); see also Yash Ghai, The Rule of Law and
Capitalism: Reflections on the Basic Law, in HONG KONG, CHINA, AND 1997, at 343,
343 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1993) (providing an earlier study in support of this
view regarding Hong Kong). The Ghai article concerns the relationship between
the basic law governing Hong Kong's status after unification with Chinese "Basic
Law," the rule of law, and Hong Kong's market economy. Id. at 344-45. Ghai
argues that despite widespread perception that capitalism requires the rule of law,
and the fact that the legitimacy of the Basic Law in Hong Kong has been anchored
in this belief, the legal system has not been particularly important to Hong Kong's
economic development. Id. at 355-56. Rather, Hong Kong has fostered a kind of
"Chinese capitalism" in which personal relationships and families are more
important than formal legal rules, Ghai further argues that after reunification
with China, the law will become even less important, which could undermine the
legitimacy of the "Basic Law." Id. at 356.
305 See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
[hereinafter WORLD BANK, EAST ASIAN MIRACLE]
PUBLIC POLICY 23-26 (1993)

(discussing the lessons of the high performing Asian economies).
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• on the grounds that it gave to strong an endorsement of
36
government intervention.... ,"0
Thus, whereas the developmental states of East Asia,
represented by the efficient state-led interventions in post-World
War II Japan and post-1960 South Korea, could easily have
provided fodder for an alternative to the laissez-faire (neo-liberal)
model of market-led growth, the World Bank study ended up
reinforcing the neo-liberal model. The Bank succeeded in doing
this by downplaying the non-market-oriented aspects of the
30 7
miracle so much that the dominant paradigm remained intact.
For example, and pressure from vested interests was such that the
study ended up saying nothing of consequence; in other words, the
30 8
dominant paradigm remained intact:
The bureaucrats with large discretionary powers to
direct the economies are explained in the study, not as
evidence of strong states but as means of cocoordinating the market.30 9 The presence of bureaucrats
with power to make choices that influenced the
Robert Wade, Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance:
The East Asian Miracle in PoliticalPerspective, 217 NEw LEFT REv. 3, 11 n.17 (1996).
307 Robert Wade documented the process of preparation of the World Bank
study in his article Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of ParadigmMaintenance. He
wrote about the conflict between various intellectual actors within the Bank,
notably Joseph Stigiltz and Lawrence Summers who sought a more open-minded
view of the East Asian experience against the opposition of more close-minded
Wade suggested that given the United States'
officials within the Bank.
investment in the current orthodoxy, the study would not have been allowed to
be a source of a more thorough going critique of neo-liberalism. Wade wrote:
306

The story of The East Asian Miracle shows the determining importance of
essentially American values and interests ....The influence comes
partly through the Bank's dependence on world financial markets, and
the self-reinforcing congruence between the values of the owners and
managers of financial capital and those of the US state. It also comes
through the Bank's staffing and professional norms ....[T]he Bank
forms part of the external infrastructural power of the US state ....
Id. at 35-36.
308 Robin Blackburn, the editor of the New Left Review, summarizes the lesson
of Wade's narrative as another affirmation of "a classic instance of reality being
tailored to fit dogma and vested interests." Robin Blackburn, Themes, 217 NEw
LEFT REV. 1, 1 (1996). Wade himself states that: "like the Vatican, and for similar
reasons, [the World Bank] cannot afford to admit fallibility." Wade, supra note
306, at 35.
309See WORLD BANK, EAST ASIAN MIRACLE, supra note 305, at 14 (discussing
how economic technocrats tackled coordination problems and devised economic
strategies).
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allocation of resources "built a business friendly
environment." 310
So the Study attached much
importance to the interaction between administrators
and business people through such means as
deliberation councils, so as to forge national priorities,
induce an exchange of market information, and
promote networking as well as coordination, rather
than the discretionary rules that allowed the
administrators to direct the economy.311
The activist policies of quickening the pace of
industrialization, exporting an increasing proportion of
industrial output, selectively using tariff protections,
and exporting incentives ranging from suasion to
subsidies and mild financial repression in order to
provide industry with financing at lower costs were all
downplayed by pointing out that they were used
312
sparingly and with caution.
The third way in which the core (of the set of policy reforms
known as the "Washington Consensus") can be ideological is by its
very own fit. When presented as a consensus or convergence, the
implication, for the most part not unintended, is that the whole
range of aspects or prescriptions is necessary for each economic
reform package. That is, there is the implication that all the aspects
of the convergence have to be implemented or else the reform
process cannot be complete. This occurs because the World Bank
conflates liberal universalism (political ideals) with the
establishment of specific macroeconomic regimes (the first nine
aspects in the list by John Williamson reproduced above).313 It then
forms a linkage between these policies and the microeconomic
regimes of countries, hence forcing them to shift their
microeconomic policies as well. Liberal democracy achieves this
by implicitly establishing liberal democracy as the telos of history,
and then positing a linkage between human rights and an
economic system in which all these aspects are present.
Id.
See id. at 14 (discussing how the deliberation councils supplemented the
markets information transmission function).
312 See Wade, supra note 306, at 22-26.
313 See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
310

311

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol26/iss3/4

20051

POLICING NEO-LIBERAL REFORMS

Once this point is made, a move is then made to link liberal
democracy with specific macroeconomic theories which are in turn
linked with very specific microeconomic policies. The program
then becomes not just one for ensuring economic development but
transferring specific institutional arrangements. Further, in this
complex and clouded web in which certain arguments are derived
from debatable premises but which are put off the table by the
posturing of the discourse, one otherwise bright fact is clouded or
lost. It is simply that different successful nations have practiced
very different forms of liberal democracy, varying macroeconomic
policies and wildly varying microeconomic policies. In this sense,
the prescription of the whole range of aspects as wholesome and
necessary is ideological. It gives the impression that the reform
would be diluted, incomplete and likely to be unsuccessful if one
chose only some aspects and only to some extent. In truth,
however, even industrialized countries of the North that provide
the model for the reform exercise practice different fits of the
aspects of reform listed by Williamson.
Hence, when and if the World Bank publishes a list of the
aspects, which a reform package must include, that particular fit of
reforms will be but one choice of the different ways to package the
reform. Many different ways to package the reform are possible,
and indeed the different countries in the North that are used as
models have utilized different fits of the aspects to different
extents.
Fourth, Williamson tells us exactly why the democracy that this
triad of rule of law, democracy, and free markets can only support
a given system of allocation of resources in an economy.
Williamson says:
I can see no advantage to democracy in having major parties
espousing economic nonsense. If they win an election, the
economy will suffer ....

Consensus on good economics is important if economic
Continual policy reversals are
reform is to succeed.
obviously disruptive.
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Since the world has its share of cranks, however, we cannot
expect unanimous endorsement of the universal convergence. A
democratic political system needs a way of allowing dissent to be
expressed. This is important both because suppression is the
best way to convince the conspiratorially minded that there
is something to hide, and because there must always
remain some doubt as to whether what deserves to pass for
conventional wisdom today will remain valid for the
indefinite future. The system needs some mechanism
whereby orthodoxy can be challenged ....

Thus my position is not that democracy should be in any
way circumscribed so as to promote good economic policy,
but rather that both economic policy and democracy will
benefit if all mainstream politicians endorse the universal
convergence and the scope of political debate on economic
314
issues is defacto circumscribed in consequence.
Williamson tells us that the democracy that the World Bank
espouses is one that springs only from the "universal
convergence." 315 This must be a given, and to the extent that
electoral competition might take place that might involve parties
that do not espouse this convergence, it is only to the extent that
they can participate in the electoral competition. In other words,
democracy means only electoral competition. Hence he ends
predictably that:
[C]ivilized politics, meaning the use of the electoral and
parliamentary systems in order to determine the
specification of the social welfare function that economic
policy should seek to maximize, still has a crucial role to
play, because there will still be a tradeoff between equity
and efficiency when Latin America [or Africa] finally gets

314 John Williamson, Democracy and the "Washington Consensus," 21 WORLD
DEV. 1330-31 (1993) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
315 Id. at 1330.
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its policies sufficiently in order to reach the frontier. 316
Williamson may as well endorse the parodied version of
Kwame Nkrumah's clarion call: Seek ye first the economic
efficiency kingdom. 3 7 The bottom line, however, is that the only
notion of democracy that the World Bank is willing to root for is
one that entails first, the "universal convergence" as its starting
point, and second, one that postpones the equity and efficiency
In the
argument until sufficient development has occurred.
meaning
politics
of
"civilized
form
meantime, democracy in the
electoral and parliamentary competitions" can go on. After all, the
options available to the electorate are already sufficiently
circumscribed to take off the table particular possibilities by
excluding particular economic policies from the realm of politics.
In other words, the "Washington Consensus" as an argument for
particular legal, social, political, and economic relations in the
polity, interacts with the rule of law as prescribed by the
international agencies that peddle the "Consensus" to empty
effective democratic participation from politics. It does this by
institutionalizing a form of participation that is disabled from
making any real changes in allocating economic, political, and
social power to the different actors in the economy and politics.
Hence, the "Washington Consensus" and the Rule of Law projects
can be seen as supplementary projects aimed at simultaneously
legislating and legitimating a particular system of distributing
resources in an economy.
10. CONCLUSION

Calls for economic and political reforms in developing
countries have invariably involved calls for the reduction of the
role and size of the state in economic affairs. The assumption is
that the reduction of the role and size of the state automatically
leads to less intervention in the economy. The rule of law is often
offered as one of the institutional designs which can achieve the
purpose of reducing the role of the government in economic
functioning. However, in this Article, I hoped to show the
316

Id. at 1333.

317 See Chris N. Okeke, The Debt Burden: An African Perspective, 35 INT'L LAW
1489, 1490 n.6 (2001) (quoting the first President of Nigeria, who, in his pursuit for
African political unity, preached the slogan: "Seek ye first the political kingdom,
and all else will follow").
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different ways in which the rule of law discourse imbues marketoriented reforms with particular substantive content and may be
deployed to increase or decrease the state's role in the economy.
Similarly, depending on the functionality of such rule of law
discourses, the rule of law may be used to enhance or undermine
the polity's democratic participation in economic decisionmaking.
Further, both legal intervention, and abstention could result in
either more or less state intervention. There is no general a priori
formula to tell how a particular intervention would result in a
particular outcome. Indeed, most attempts to justify a legal
intervention or abstention by determinately linking it with
particular outcomes are often bad faith arguments aimed at
justifying particular programmatic proposals. This is because such
interventions or abstention do not occur in vacuo but within a
certain social, political, and economic context that is an aggregation
of preexisting social and economic relations. Hence, a particular
intervention or abstention necessarily involves the marginalization,
suppression, qualification, or consolidation of preexisting social
and economic relations, and therefore of specific historical
alternatives. 318
In this Article, I aimed to show how international development
agencies' making the institution of rule of law operational through
development agencies ends up subverting democracy in
application. It does this by simultaneously cushioning some
fundamental political questions from political debate while
enacting the politically agreed upon procedurally fundamental
rules. The conception of the rule of law that is in operation,
therefore, is one that constricts its meaning to purely economic
desiderata (at the same time assuming that there is an objective
way to determine the economic desiderata, and excluding other
socially relevant desiderata). At the same time, this conception of
the rule of law operates by simultaneously appealing to more
widely agreed upon and less controversial notions of procedure.
In other words, this conception of the rule of law is neither solely
formalist (reducible to a checklist of formal criteria) nor substantive
(justifiable or reflective of particular political or economic
interests). It reflects the political and economic interests, while
meeting the more formal, legal criterion.
It can take the
318 GERRY R. RUBIN & DAVID SUGARMAN, LAW, ECONOMY & SOCIETY, 1750-1914:

Rubin & David Sugarman eds., 1984)
(describing how preexisting social and economic relations influenced English law
on occasion).
ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (G. R.
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substantive or the procedural conception at different times in the
same place.
The main argument of this article then is that while the assault
of the developmental states of the developing countries has been,
in large part, justified on the grounds that it allowed leaders to
dispense with the substance of democratic participation while
retaining its formal aspects, the rule of law agenda that
international development agencies hope will return democracy in
these countries acts by precisely the same means: reducing the
political options of the polities. While most developing countries
in the pre-1980 period reduced political participation by the use of
violence and coercion, this article has shown that the new reform
agenda uses the rule of law and other legal categories to achieve
the same purpose. The panacea for reforming the reform agenda,
therefore, might require us to do more than merely expand the rule
of law and its promises.3 19 Seemingly, we will have to modify our
understanding about how the rule of law operates to shrink
political space, and in the process replace the establishment of
public-command-political predatory rule with private-markettechnocratic predatory rule.

319 See Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 86, at 108 (arguing that the World
Bank's conception of the rule of law is too restrictive).
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